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This dissertation attempts to address the elusive concept of “graduation”, that 
is the emergence from frequent crisis suffering status. It contains two chapters. The 
first uses a data set covering over two hundred years of sovereign debt, banking and 
inflation crises to explore the question of how long does it take a country to 
“graduate” from the typical pattern of serial crises that most emerging markets 
experience.  We find that for default and inflation crises, twenty years is a significant 
period, but the distribution of recidivism has extremely fat tails. In the case of banking 
crises, it is unclear whether countries ever graduate.  We also examine the more recent 
phenomenon of IMF programs, which sometimes result in “near misses” but 
sometimes end in default even after a program is instituted.  
The second chapter investigates the impact of countries’ institutions on their 
likelihood of sovereign default from both an empirical and theoretical perspective. By 
employing a dataset of more than 80 countries, two facts emerge: 1) high institutional 
quality is associated with a low frequency of sovereign default crisis, and 2) in 
particular, polarized governments tend to default more often. To explain these facts, 
we developed a model that establishes a link between institutions, government 
polarization and sovereign default crises. Countries that lack rules and institutional 
settings to limit the pressure of powerful groups on a central government’s policies 
default more often than countries that do have good institutions. Given that there are 
no barriers to limit the influence of powerful groups, a more polarized government 
defaults more because groups do not coordinate, giving rise to a negative externality. 
Simulations of the model succeed in matching the cross-country differences in 
sovereign default frequencies, given their institutional quality and degree of 




















Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the 
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
Of the requirements for the degree of  













Professor Carmen Reinhart, Chair 
Professor Carlos Vegh, Chair 
Professor Pablo D’Erasmo 
Professor Anton Korinek 























































 I owe my gratitude to all the people who have made this thesis possible.  
 First and foremost, I am deeply indebted to my advisors Carmen Reinhart and 
Carlos Vegh. Carmen has been my mentor, my coauthor and my friend throughout my 
graduate studies. She guided me into this fascinating field, encouraged me to start my 
research, gave me the opportunity to work with her and provided strong support at 
each stage of this project. The invaluable conversations we had shaped the way I think 
about economics and the way I look at the data, and they will continue to influence 
my future research. I am grateful for her continuous guidance and confidence in me in 
even the most difficult moments. I am also heartily thankful to Carlos, whose 
encouragement, guidance and support from the initial to the final stage of this project 
enabled me to develop a clear understanding of the subject. He has taught me the 
power and the beauty of simplicity and clarity in doing research.  
 My special thanks also go to Enrique Mendoza and Pablo D’Erasmo for their 
extremely helpful comments and generous encouragement. They were always ready 
to meet me when I needed. Talking with them helped me immensely to understand 
many important technical and nontechnical issues in the frontier of the profession. I 
would like to thank Anton Korinek for generously dedicated his time reading my draft 
and giving excellent editorial comments.  
 I owe also special recognition to my colleges and friends Agustin Roitman, 
Cesar Sosa Padilla, Maria Belen Sbrancia and Pablo Federico. They were there when 
I needed comments and advices for this project; they were there to hear my rehearsals 
for the presentations; they were there to encourage and support me when I was 
 
iv 
emotionally drained.  I am grateful to have them in my life, without them this journey 
would be ten times more difficult.  
 I own my deepest thanks to my husband, Star, for his unconditional and 
unwavering support and love along the journey of life. He has been my source of 
strength and inspiration. He always stands by my side, believing in my potential and 
encouraged me to overcome the life obstacles that came along the way. I could not 
imagine this process without him. My gratitude also goes to my parents for their 










List of Tables ................................................................................................................ vi 
List of Figures.............................................................................................................. vii 
Introduction.................................................................................................................... 1 
1 On Graduation from Default, Inflation and Banking Crisis: Elusive or Illusion?...... 5 
1.1 Introduction.......................................................................................................... 5 
1.2 Definition of Crises.............................................................................................. 9 
1.3 A time line of financial crises and the early history of sovereign defaults ....... 12 
1.4 The Duration and Prevalence of Crises: The Post 1800 Experience ................. 18 
1.5 The interval between consecutive crises............................................................ 26 
1.6 Time since last crisis.......................................................................................... 32 
1.7 Macroeconomic volatility.................................................................................. 37 
1.8 Crisis and Role of IMF programs: 1952-2007................................................... 40 
1.9 Graduation and the Theory of Sovereign Default.............................................. 42 
1.10 Conclusions...................................................................................................... 45 
2 Why do some countries default more often than others? The role of institutions.... 47 
2.1 Introduction........................................................................................................ 47 
2.2 Data and Findings .............................................................................................. 51 
2.2.1 Data Description and Source ...................................................................... 51 
2.2.2 Facts............................................................................................................ 53 
2.2.3 Discussion................................................................................................... 61 
2.3 A Simple Theory of Government Polarization and Default Probability ........... 63 
2.3.1 Optimization Problem of the Unified Government .................................... 65 
2.3.2 Optimization Problem of the Polarized Government ................................. 67 
2.3.3 Foreign Lenders .......................................................................................... 68 
2.3.4 Timing of the Events .................................................................................. 70 
2.3.5 The Equilibrium.......................................................................................... 71 
2.4 Extending the Model to Infinite Periods............................................................ 76 
2.4.1 Model Setup................................................................................................ 76 
2.4.2 Default Decision in Unified Government................................................... 77 
2.4.3 Default Decision in the Polarized Government .......................................... 79 
2.4.4 The Equilibrium Bond Price....................................................................... 80 
2.5 Quantitative Analysis ........................................................................................ 81 
2.5.1 Functional Forms and Parameters .............................................................. 81 
2.5.2 Simulation Results ...................................................................................... 82 
2.6 Conclusions........................................................................................................ 87 
Appendices .............................................................................................................. 90 




List of Tables 
 
Table 1. Table 1- Timeline of crises 1550-2010 
Table 2- External defaults: Europe, 1550-1850 
Table 3- Summary statistics of crisis probabilities 
Table 4- Medians of distance (in years) to last crisis in 2010 
Table 5- Examples of cases where IMF programs are introduced but there is 
subsequent default 
Table 6- Summary Statistics of Institutional Quality and Default Probability 
Table 7- Summary Statistics of Government Characteristics and Default Probability 
Table 8 - Cross-country regression of sovereign default risk and institutions 
Table 9- Summary Statistics of Default Probabilities: Simulations Results 
Table A1- Average duration of crises 
Table A2- Default episodes that began after and during severe wars   












List of Figures 
 
Figure 1- External default crises: Duration of “tranquil time”.  Frequency distribution 
(in percent): 1300-1799. High income countries  
Figure 2- Share of countries in inflation crisis: 1800-2008. World 
Figure 3- Share of countries in banking crisis: 1800-2008. World 
Figure 4- Share of countries in external default crisis: 1800-2008. High income vs. 
Middle and Low income 
Figure 5- Share of countries in inflation crisis: 1800-2008. High income vs. Middle 
and Low income 
Figure 6- Share of countries in banking crisis: 1800-2008. High income vs. Middle 
and Low income 
Figure 7- Duration of “tranquil times” conditional on having had at least one crisis. 
Frequency distribution (in percent): 1800-2008 
Figure 8 - External default crises: Duration of “tranquil time” conditional on having 
had at least one crisis. Frequency distribution (in percent): 1800-2008. High vs. 
Middle and Low income 
Figure 9 - Inflation crises: Duration of “tranquil time” conditional on having had at 
least one crisis. Frequency distribution (in percent): 1800-2008. High vs. Middle and 
Low income 
Figure 10- Banking crises: Duration of “tranquil time” conditional on having had at 




Figure 11- Time elapsed by 2010 since last external default crisis, 1800 or year of 
independence: High vs. Middle and Low income 
Figure 12- Time elapsed by 2010 since last inflation crisis, 1800 or year of 
independence: High vs. Middle and Low income 
Figure 13- Time elapsed by 2010 since the last banking crisis, 1800 or year of 
independence: High vs. Middle and Low income 
Figure 14- Evolution of GDP growth rate volatility: 1950-2006. High vs. Middle and 
Low income 
Figure 15- Evolution of GDP growth rate volatility: 1950-2006. Commodities 
exporting countries: Emerging vs. Benchmark 
Figure 16- The Incidence of IMF Programs in Advanced and Emerging Economies: 
1952-2007 
Figures 17- Default Probability versus ICRG institutional index 
Figures 18- Default Probability versus Government Effectiveness 
Figures 19- Default Probability versus Control for Corruption 
Figures 20- Default Probability versus Fragmentation 
Figures 21- Default Probability versus Polarization 
Figure 22- Bond price schedule: Unified government  
Figure 23- Default rule: Unified government 
Figure 24- Bond price schedule: Polarized government (η=0.5) 
Figure 25- Default rule: Polarized government (η=0.5) 
Figure 26- Bond price schedule: Polarized government (η=0.1)  
Figure 27- Default rule: Polarized government (η=0.1)  
 
ix 
Figure A1- Duration of external default crises. Frequency distribution (in percent): 
1800-2008. High vs. Middle and low income 
Figure A2- Duration of “tranquil times” conditional on having had at least one crisis. 
Frequency distribution (in percent): 1800-2008. Excluding defaults started after and 
during severe wars. 
Figure A3- External default crises*: Duration of “tranquil times” conditional on 
having had at least one crisis. Frequency distribution (in percent): 1800-2008. High 
vs. Middle and Low income 
Figure B1- Hazard rate of default reversal:  Full sample 


















How a country “graduates”—emerges from recurrent financial crisis bouts—is 
probably one of the most important issues in macroeconomics and international 
finance. Many advanced countries had enjoyed a long hiatus from systemic banking 
crises after World War II, and yet had huge problems during the recent global 
financial crisis.  After ninety years of serial default running from 1557 to 1647, Spain 
did not default again until 1809. More recently, Greece was in “near” default, 76 
years after its last episode that started in 1932. Even the advanced countries had high 
inflation as recently as the 1970s and early 1980s, while many emerging markets had 
hyperinflation less than two decades ago.  Is the advent of modern independent central 
banks sufficient to guarantee that fiscal dominance never again reasserts itself?  Have 
the rich countries that have supposedly “graduated” from serial default on external 
debt, shifted the locus of risk to de jure or de facto (via inflation or financial 
repression) default on domestic debt?  Does the theory of sovereign default or of 
financial development tell us that we should expect richer and more advanced 
countries to be immune? What makes some countries more prone to crises than 
others? Is it possible that graduation is just a mirage, with the “graduates” really being 
at best “star pupils”? And, how can we distinguish “graduates” from patients in 
remission? 
There has been remarkably little theoretical or empirical investigation of the 
subject. For example, the large theory literature on sovereign lending and default, 
while producing many important insights on the fundamental distinction between 




and political characteristics as parametric.  There is very little on explaining the 
political, social, economic and financial dynamics that ultimately lead a country to be 
less prone to certain types of crises.  
 In Chapter 1, we examine the incidence and the risk of reversals of default, 
inflation and banking crises across advanced economies versus middle and low 
income countries. The data covers sixty-six countries over more than two hundred 
years. We find that the process of “graduation” is seldom accomplished in a short 
time frame.  Because financial crises tend to occur only at very long periodicities, it is 
easy to forget that they happen at all. Premature declaration of victory is a recurrent 
mistake. For example, Argentina was the poster child within the international 
community as late as 1998-1999 (on the eve of disaster) and is an illustration of this 
tendency. In our study, we find that two decades without a relapse is an important 
marker to signal the “first step” toward graduation, but there are still relatively high 
odds of relapsing into crisis even after several decades of tranquility.  
 In terms of vulnerability to crisis, high income countries differ from middle 
and low income countries mostly in external default crisis. On the one hand, the 
inferior performance of middle and low income countries is easy to explain.  
Emerging market countries face deeper and more permanent shocks (as Aguiar and 
Gopinath, 2006, emphasized), at the same time, tend to engage in procyclical 
macroeconomic policy, as Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004) documented.  On the 
other hand, explaining graduation is quite difficult, because standard models of 
default (following Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981) do not necessarily suggest that richer 
countries should necessarily be less prone to default.  The key penalty to default in the 




smooth national consumption through international markets. Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1996) found that the empirical cost of exclusion from international markets is 
considerably greater for emerging markets than for advanced economies; thus, 
emerging economies should have more incentive to repay than advanced economies.  
 An even more striking finding is that Latin America countries defaulted more 
times than other countries. Venezuela defaulted 10 times and Argentina 7 times over 
the last 200 years while India and Malaysia have never done so. The fact that they 
presumably faced similar external shocks and were at a similar stage of development 
suggests that factors other than macroeconomic fundamentals may be important in 
determining countries’ likelihoods of default, for example, political factors.  
 The importance of institutions in growth performance and debt crises has been 
highlighted in the empirical literature. Acemoglu et al. (2003) argued that countries 
pursuing poor macroeconomic policies also have weak institutions. Kraay and Nehru 
(2004) found the quality of policies and institutions are an important determinant of 
debt distress. Government polarization has been argued to explain over-accumulation 
of public debt either because the current government has different preferences on 
spending than their opponent; hence, it does not internalize the full future cost of 
serving the debt, Alesina and Tabellini (1990); or because polarization brings delay 
stabilization, Alesina and Drazen (1991). Another strand of the literature emphasizes 
the role of budgetary institutions on fiscal and debt outcomes. Von Hagen (1992) and 
von Hagen and Harden (1995) found that budget institutions have a significant impact 
on debt ratios in the countries of the European Union.  Alesina, Hausmann, Hommes 
and Stein (1996) have extended this line of research to developing countries. They 




effect on primary deficits. Sanguinetti and Tommassi reported similar findings (1997) 
in their study of Argentine provinces. However, a theoretical analysis and empirical 
evidence that links institutions, government polarization and default crisis has been 
lacking.  This provides the motivation for chapter 2.  
 In chapter 2, we focus on the institutions environment as an important arena in 
which powerful groups take action. Such powerful groups can be political leaders, 
provincial governments, labor unions, parastatal enterprises and financial backers of 
the ruling government. Institutions matter because they can affect the rule of the game 
under which groups interact. Countries with good institutions are those where the 
budgetary process has clear and enforceable legal rules that make it almost impossible 
for powerful groups to influence the central government’s fiscal and debt policies, or 
those in which powerful groups coordinate and act as one agent. In a bad institutional 
environment, the budgetary process is flawed or there are soft budget constraints; 
limits to powerful groups are absent. Powerful groups that act in a non-cooperative 
manner maximize their own welfare ignoring the consequence of their actions on 
other groups. Under this situation, the size of the inefficiency, in the form of a higher 
risk premium, compared to the planner’s solution that maximizes the collective 






On Graduation from Default, Inflation and Banking Crisis: 
Elusive or Illusion? 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This paper addresses the concept of “graduation” from external default, 
banking and inflation crises.1   Employing a vast data set cataloging more than two 
centuries of financial crises for over sixty countries developed in Reinhart and 
Rogoff, (2009), we explore the risk of recidivism across advanced economies versus 
middle and low income countries.  We show that two decades without a relapse 
(falling into crisis) is an important marker. Post 1800, roughly two thirds of 
recurrences of external default on sovereign debt, and three quarters of recurrence of 
inflation crisis, occur within twenty years.2  However, crisis recidivism distributions 
have very fat tails, so that it takes at least fifty and perhaps a hundred years to 
meaningfully speak of “graduation”.  Indeed, in the case of banking crises in 
particular, it is hard to argue that any country in the world has truly graduated. 
Given that graduation (with its companion question—will this ever happen 
again) is arguably one of the most important issues in macroeconomics and 
development, there has been remarkably little theoretical or empirical investigation of 
                                                        
1 The notion of “graduation” was introduced in Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003). An 
inflation crisis is defined as an annual inflation rate of twenty percent or higher. Given the 
very large correlation between exchange rate and inflation crises over this period (Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2004, 2010), we do not to treat exchange rate crises separately in this paper. 
 




the subject. For example, the large theory literature on sovereign lending and default, 
while producing many important insights on the fundamental distinction between 
willingness to pay and ability to pay, largely treats a country’s basic developmental 
and political characteristics as parametric.  There is very little on explaining the 
political, social, economic and financial dynamics that ultimately lead a country to be 
less prone to certain types of crises. 
We acknowledge that the concept of graduation is a hard nut to crack. Many 
advanced countries had enjoyed a long hiatus from systemic banking crises after 
World War II, and yet had huge problems during the recent global financial crisis.  
After ninety years of serial default running from 1557 to 1647, Spain did not default 
again until 1809.  Even the advanced countries had high inflation as recently as the 
1970s and early 1980s, while many emerging markets had hyperinflation less than 
two decades ago.  Is the advent of modern independent central banks sufficient to 
guarantee that fiscal dominance never again reasserts itself?  Have the rich countries 
that have supposedly “graduated” from serial default on external debt, shifted the 
locus of risk to de jure or de facto (via inflation or financial repression) default on 
domestic debt?  Does the theory of sovereign default or of financial development tell 
us that we should expect richer and more advanced countries to be immune?  Or is 
graduation a mirage, with the “graduates” really being at best “star pupils”, and can 
graduates be distinguished from patients in remission? 
Our goals in this paper are fairly narrowly circumscribed. Most of our analysis 




underlying causal factors but do not approach them empirically here.3 Although the 
various types of crises often occur in clusters, our quantitative analysis mainly treats 
individual crises separately.  
We begin the paper by defining the crises that we will catalogue.  In the next 
section of the paper, we present a summary timeline of crisis, followed by a brief 
overview of the early history of serial default on external debt. An interesting case is 
France, which defaulted on its external debt no less than nine times from the middle 
of the sixteenth century through the end of the Napoleonic War, but has not defaulted 
on external debt since. France is a canonical case of what we define as an “external 
default graduate.”  (This did not stop France from having numerous severe banking 
crises in the past two centuries.) 
In the main body of the paper, we provide a broad aggregative historical 
overview of the data across different types of crises, distinguishing between advanced 
countries and emerging markets, also taking into account the advent of IMF programs 
after World War II as another marker of a debt crisis.   
In the final section of the paper before the conclusions, we speculate on links 
between graduation and development, and the possibility for recidivism among richer 
countries.  The fact that the canonical theory of sovereign default does not strongly 
predict smaller problems in richer countries (it does not strongly predict graduation) 
might be considered a flaw in theory.  But it might also be taken as warning sign that 
graduation can be more difficult and take even more time, than our data of “just” a 
                                                        
3 Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) formally investigate the predictive power of past banking and 
sovereign default crises and future ones.  Among their results is the finding that banking 
crises do help predict sovereign default crises, that private debt levels help predict banking 




few centuries can reveal.  On banking crises, the theory needs to better explain why 
countries never seem to graduate. 
The main empirical results from our long-dated historical time series on 
financial crises may be described as follows:  
First, the process of “graduation”, that is emergence from frequent crisis 
suffering status, is a long process. False starts are common and recurrent.  This is 
especially true in the case of banking crises, for both high and middle and low income 
countries. 
Second, the vulnerability to crisis in high income countries versus middle and 
low income countries differs mostly in external default crises, to a lesser extent in 
inflation crises, and differs surprisingly little in banking crises.4 
Third, the sequence of graduation for most of countries is first to graduate 
from external default crisis, then from inflation crisis, and eventually from banking. 
The last stage of graduation is extremely difficult, even for high income countries. 
Among high income countries, even though most of them have graduated from 
external default crisis and inflation crisis, more than 20 percent recently experienced a 
banking crisis, and far more when weighted by size.  Schularick and Taylor (2009) 
speculate that advanced countries continue to experience credit busts despite arguably 
advancing regulation and institutions, because as risks moderate, financial systems 
grow and restore them. 
Finally, the role of IMF programs in crises in the modern period is important. 
The availability of IMF bridge loans certainly has increased countries’ resilience to 
                                                        





“sudden stops” but, even setting aside moral hazard problems, is by no means a cure-
all. Countries entering IMF programs are still forced to undergo painful 
macroeconomic adjustments in an attempt to regain sound fiscal footing and regain 
access to private capital markets.  The challenges of successfully implementing IMF 
programs are underscored by the fact that there are many significant cases where 
countries default within three years of an IMF bailout. IMF programs may help 
facilitate orderly debt workouts but do not guarantee them.  We also note that in its 
early history, many of today’s rich countries regularly drew on IMF resources, 
although there has been a three-decade hiatus. 
 
1.2 Definition of Crises 
 External debt crisis:  We distinguish between external and internal debt based 
on the legal jurisdiction where the debt contracts are enforced. This is a convenient 
construct given the history and evolution of sovereign debt.  Obviously it may be 
useful to parse the data in other ways for some exercises, and in principle our data set 
allows that.  
Although there are exceptions and there has been some evolution in recent 
years, typically in our long-dated historical dataset, external debt is denominated in 
foreign currency and held by foreign creditors.  There are certainly important 
examples, such as Mexico’s short-term Tesobono bonds in the mid 1990s, where the 
debt is domestic yet denominated in foreign currency and held primarily by foreign 
creditors.  Although we regard the US abrogation of the gold clause in the early 1930s 
– when gold was revalued from $21 to $35 per ounce – to be a default on domestic 




following standard practice, we define an external debt crisis as any failure to meet 
contractual repayment obligations on foreign debts, including both rescheduling or 
repayments and outright default.  (As both of these examples make clear however, 
one ultimately needs to think carefully about whether graduation from external default 
may sometimes just mean a shift to episodic de facto and de jure internal default.) 
In practice, most defaults on external debt end up being partial, with creditors 
typically (but not always) repaying thirty to seventy cents or more on the dollar, 
admittedly not adjusting for risk.  The rationale for lumping together defaults 
regardless of the ultimate haircuts creditors are forced to absorb is that in practice, the 
fixed costs of external debt default (which include difficulties in obtaining trade 
credits and loss of reputation) tend to be large relative to the variable costs.  In 
principle, one could parse episodes more finely here according to, say, output or tax 
revenue loss depending on data availability, although we do not undertake that 
exercise here. See, however, Tomz (2007), and Tomz and Wright (2007). 
Inflation crises:  Following Reinhart and Rogoff, we define inflation crises as 
episodes where annual inflation exceeds 20%.  This threshold is lower than the 40% 
others and we have used in related studies on post war data (e.g., Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2004), but is a compromise reflecting that prior to World War I, average 
inflation rates were much lower, and 20% inflation generally represented a significant 
level of dysfunction.  Indeed, since we are particularly interested here in inflation as 
vehicle for partial default, one clearly would also want to consider lower levels of 
sustained unanticipated inflation such as many advanced countries experienced in the 
1970.  Depending on the maturity structure of debt, sustained ten percent inflation can 




require detailed data on the maturity structure of debt (as in Missale and Blanchard, 
1994) and, ideally, also on the evolution of inflation expectations.  We do not attempt 
this here, though again, this is an important caveat to interpreting the concept of 
“graduation” from external debt crises. 
Banking crises:  Our definition of banking crises follows standard practice 
(e.g., Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) or Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998).)  Following our 
own earlier work,  “We mark a banking crises by two types of events:  (1) bank runs 
that lead to the closure, merging or takeover by the public sector of one or more 
financial institutions and (2) if there are no runs, the closure, merging, takeover, or 
large-scale government assistance of an important financial institution (or group of 
institutions) that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other financial 
institutions.”  (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, p. 11)  
We recognize that our listing of systemic (on a national scale) banking crises 
may be incomplete, especially prior to 1970, especially for crises outside the large 
money centers that attract the attention of the world financial press. 5 
Having set out basic definitions, we are now ready to view some basic 
characteristics of the data.  To provide context and motivation for the concept of 
graduation, we begin with a summary time line of financial crises since 1550, 
followed by a brief overview of the early history of sovereign defaults. 
                                                        
5 We do not include domestic debt crises or exchange rate crises in this study, but some 
comment is warranted to put the overall exercise in perspective.  Although overt de jure 
defaults on domestic debt have been received very little attention in the literature, Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2008, 2009) show that they were once surprisingly common, cataloging over 70 
cases of domestic default.   We do not explore exchange rate crises here, in part because 
inflation and exchange rate crises are highly correlated (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, 
2010).  Also, it is clear that standard definitions of exchange rate crises (emphasizing very 





1.3 A time line of financial crises and the early history of 
sovereign defaults 
 Table 1 provides a summary historical perspective that helps show how the 
three different varieties of financial crisis have spread over time and across country 
groups.  Between 1550 and 1800, sovereign defaults on external were relatively 
common in Europe, but they were relatively rare elsewhere if only because (a) there 
were few other independent nations in a position to default and (b) given the crude 
state of global capital markets, relatively few countries were wealthy enough to attract 
international capital flows.  Thus defaults were relatively insignificant in the regions 
that constitute today’s emerging markets.  Systemic banking crises, on the other hand, 
were relatively rare everywhere.  The legal and technological underpinnings of 
modern private banking simply had not reached a stage of maturity and depth 
sufficient to cause systemic crises in most instances.  (Of course, there are exceptions.  
Following Cipolla (1982) and MacDonald (2006), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) discuss 
how England’s 1340 default to Florentine bankers triggered a financial crisis in Italy.)  
Similarly, inflation crises were relatively rare, although again there are many 
exceptions.6  Prior to the widespread adoption of paper currency, bouts of very high 
inflation were relatively difficult to engineer.  
 The end of Napoleonic War in the early 1800s marks a significant transition. 
The largest advanced countries were increasingly able to avoid external default, albeit 
partly by their ability to issue an increasing share of their debt domestically.  Default, 
however, became common on “peripheral” advanced countries such as Spain and 
                                                        




Portugal, while newly independent emerging markets such as Greece and Latin 
America entered a long period of serial default.  Over the same period, as advanced 
countries developed more sophisticated banking systems, banking crises became far 
more common.  Emerging markets were certainly affected by advanced country 
banking crisis but did not have so many of their own, if only because their financial 
systems were dominated by foreign banks.   
 By the turn of the twentieth century, emerging market financial institutions 
had developed to the point where domestic banking crises became more common.  By 
the time of the Great Depression of the 1930s, banking crises were a worldwide 
phenomenon.  Due in no small part to the financial repression that followed in 
reaction to the Great Depression, banking crises were relatively rare during the period 
from the end of World War II until the early 1970s.  As financial repression thawed, 
banking crises became more frequent in the advanced economies and serial in many 
emerging markets, bringing us to the recent financial crisis episode. 
 Finally, table 1 gives a timeline of inflation crises, which of course were quite 
common in all countries in the 1970s and remained a problem in emerging markets 




Table 1- Timeline of crises 1550-2010 
 
We thus focus our early history on sovereign external defaults.  As Reinhart, 
Rogoff and Savastano (2003) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) emphasize, many of 
today’s advanced economies had recurrent problems with default on sovereign debt 
during the period when they might arguably have been characterized as emerging 
markets.  Table 2 illustrates the case of Europe for the three century period 1550-









Years of default 
 
Number of defaults 
Austria-Hungary 1796, 1802, 1805, 1811, 
1816 
5 
England 1594* 1* 
France 1558, 1624, 1648 
1661, 1701, 1715 





























1557, 1575, 1596, 
1607, 1627, 1647 







Sources: Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. 
The “*” for England denotes our uncertainty at this time about whether its default involved external (as 
opposed to purely domestic) debt.  The table excludes Greece (which gained independence in 1829).  
Note that for some countries, even if there was default on external debt, there may have been a default 
on domestic debt, as was the case for Denmark (1813). 
 
As one can see clearly from the table, serial default was quite common among the 
major European powers during the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries, with 
France defaulting on its external debt nine time and Spain defaulting ten times (with 
three more to follow in the second half of the nineteenth century).  One important 
observation, immediately apparent from the table, is that there is typically a 




(Note that we require at least two years between default episodes to regard them as 
independent events.)  After defaulting in 1683, Prussia’s next default episode did not 
follow for more than a century in 1807. Portugal, after defaulting in 1560, did not 
default again until 1828, when the country lapsed into a period of serial default that 
did not end until 1890.  At this writing, Portugal has not defaulted again since.  
(Importantly, during a significant portion of Portugal’s quiescent period, it had 
effectively lost its independence.)  
 Figure 1 gives a measure of the duration of periods of recidivism during the 
pre-Napoleonic era for the independent (relatively) high income countries our sample. 
The figure captures the length of time between default episodes (including cases 
where there was no recidivism) As one can see from the figure, fully half of all 
default recurrences occurred after a more than 20 year hiatus, with a significant 





External default crises: Duration of “tranquil time”   
Frequency distribution (in percent): 1300-1799 
High income countries 
 
Note: Duration of tranquil time is calculated as number of years between two consecutive external 
defaults starting years. We first count the number of external default episodes; then calculate the 
duration of tranquil time if it was reversed and finally we calculate the frequency distribution.  
Sample coverage: 14 episodes of default crisis with reversal and 2 episodes with no reversal, six 
countries (United Kingdom, Spain, Germany (Prussia), Portugal, Austria and France) 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited therein and authors’ calculations. 
 
Advanced country external sovereign debt defaults have become much rarer 
events in the modern era.  Germany’s most recent default occurred in 1939, Austria’s 
in 1940 and Hungary’s in 1941  (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).  Especially interesting 
are the cases of Sweden and France.  France, despite a near record level of defaults in 
its pre-Napoleonic era, has not defaulted on external debt since.  Sweden, too, has not 
defaulted on external debt since its default at the end of the Napoleonic War in 1812.  
It would be interesting to explore whether war time defaults are less damaging to 
reputation than peacetime defaults, though of course over many episodes, it is 
precisely the propensity to wage war that motivates many countries to build up large 
debts (as in the tax smoothing model of Barro, 1979).  Later, we will consider the 





















 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) also show that the kind of long cycles illustrated 
in Table 2 to be quite characteristic of some of today’s emerging markets, many of 
whom have defaulted at least once during the past two to three decades.  The number 
of emerging markets that have experienced external debt crises expands considerably 
if one includes “near default” episodes in which country’s averted technical default 
thanks to IMF bridge loans.  In virtually of all these cases, the countries still suffered 
massive recessions as governments were forced to tighten fiscal policy as borrowing 
options dried up.  Importantly, we do not include these in our calculations below, 
although arguably from the point of view of understanding macroeconomic volatility 
and the dangers of excessive debt accumulation, they are equally important. We return 
to this issue later when we study IMF programs. 
 
1.4 The Duration and Prevalence of Crises: The Post 1800 
Experience 
We now proceed to focus on the more “recent” period, 1800-present, at the 
same time expanding the analysis to include banking and inflation crises, which, as 
shown in table 2, emerged as important in this era.  The past two centuries also give a 
much broader sample of independent nations to study, as various regions of the world 
threw off the yoke of colonialization.   In table 3 below, we present measures of crisis 
probability.   Each measure takes the number of years a country experienced each 
kind of crisis (including all years and not just the initial one) divided by the number of 
years since independence (or since 1800). 
Table 3 shows that the biggest difference between high income countries and 




default crisis probability of high income group is less than half of middle and low 
income countries and almost one fifth of Latin America countries.  The difference 
would be even larger if we included only 20th and 21st century defaults.  Inflation 
crisis probabilities are also higher in the rest of the world than in high income 
countries although the gap is smaller. Interestingly, the average probability of banking 
crises in high income countries and the rest of the world is similar.7  The results in 
Table 3 are, of course, complete consistent with the time line in table 1. 
 
Table 3- Summary statistics of crisis probabilities 
 External Default Inflation Banking 
 Average Std Dev Average Std Dev Average Std Dev 
World 0.19 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.07 
High income 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.04 
Middle and low* 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.11 0.09 
Latin America 0.34 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.03 
Notes: crisis probability is calculated as the number of years in crisis divided by number of years 
since independence. Probabilities were calculated for each country since 1800 or country’s 
independence year 
* Excluding Latin America 
Sample coverage: 66 countries for external default crisis; 67 countries for inflation and banking crisis. 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited therein and authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Note that inflation and banking crisis probabilities are lower in part because 
the average duration of these crises tends to be much shorter compared to external 
default crises. (Note also that we are counting years in crisis, as opposed to the 
number of independent events.) 8 
                                                        
7 The similarity of banking crises across countries was first noted in Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009, ch 10, who also show that the macroeconomic effects of banking crises are remarkably 
similar as well across advanced economies and emerging markets. 
 
8 Interestingly, inflation crisis probabilities are higher among middle-low income countries 
(excluding Latin America) than in Latin America, while their default crisis probability is 
lower. This is partly due to the fact that low income countries are often excluded from 




Appendix A Table A1, which gives the average duration of crises, shows the 
striking difference between the mean and median duration of external default crises 
versus inflation and banking crises.  The median duration of banking crises is less 
than 3 years or less across all income classes, where the world median for default 
crises is 8 years.  For inflation crises, the median is only 1 year across all income 
classes.  Presumably this implies that a country can find ways to trudge in a state of 
sovereign default far more easily than it can continue any semblance of business as 
usual during a banking or inflation crisis. 
Given the long duration of external default crises, and their frequency, it is not 
surprising that large portions of the world have been in default over much of the last 
200 years, as illustrated by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, p. 72). Some of the major 
default episodes include the Napoleonic Wars in the early 19th century, and then Latin 
America countries once independent, Greece, Spain and Portugal in the first quarter of 
the century.  The biggest default spike occurs during the era bridged the Great 
Depression and World War II, when at the peak more than 40% of the world, 
weighted by GDP, was in default on external debt. 
Figure 2 gives the share of countries in inflation crisis over the same period.  
Note the huge rise in inflation crises starting after World Wars I and II, again in the 
1980s and early 1990s.   The very recent history of low inflation throughout most of 
the world indeed represents a major shift from the preceding 80 years.  It remains to 
be seen whether inflation is a scourge that has been slain. As Rogoff (2003) has 
argued, institutional changes, including especially the advent of independent central 
banks with a strong anti-inflation commitment has been an important factor in this 




pressures on central banks to engage in unanticipated inflation.  It remains to be seen 
whether the current period will prove merely another lull (one sees many in Figure 2) 
as opposed to permanent structural shift towards universal low and stable inflation.   
Indeed, if one truly believes that fiscal dominance will never again assert itself 
in most countries, and then arguably, historical measures of outright default may 
underestimate the true probabilities (if the option of default via surprise inflation has 
been effectively erased). The recent explosion of public debt globally underscores this 
concern. 
Figure 2 
Share of countries in inflation crisis: 1800-2008 
World 
 
Sample coverage: 66 countries that were independent in the given year.  
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited therein and authors’ calculations. 
Figure 3 gives the share of the world experiencing banking crises since 1800.  
Note the remarkably small number of banking crises during the years of financial 


























the 1970s.  By historical standards, this was a uniquely quiescent period. It is clear 
also from the figure that this era has been long but seems coming to an end. 
 
Figure 3 
Share of countries in banking crisis: 1800-2008   
World 
 
Sample coverage: 66 countries that were independent in the given year. 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited therein and authors’ calculations. 
 
The next three figures contrast the experiences of high income countries with 
middle and low income countries (including Latin America).  They corroborate what 
we have already seen in Table 3, but give more detail.  Figure 4 on external debt 
crises, for example, illustrates two points.  First, as already noted, middle and low 
income countries are in technical default on external debt a significantly higher 
percentage of the time than high income countries.  Second, the high income countries 


























writing!) since the advent of floating exchange rates in the 1970s.  Later we shall look 
at evidence on distance since the last default crisis. (Note:  We exclude from our 
middle and low income countries very low income countries who do not have external 
default by virtue of the fact they are not able to borrow at all on private markets.) 
 
Figure 4 
Share of countries in external default crisis: 1800-2008 
High income vs. Middle and Low income 
 
Sample coverage: 66 countries (23 high income and 43 middle and low income countries) that were 
independent in the given year.  
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited therein and authors’ calculations. 
 
 
High income countries seem to have graduated from default crisis, or at least 
gone into deep remission.  But most middle and low income countries have not yet 
graduated.  
Figure 5 shows inflation crises frequencies in middle and low income 
countries versus high income countries.  High income countries have had inflation 



























zero since the early 1990s.  For middle and low income countries, a spike in the 1990s 
has been followed by a sharp tapering during the 2000s.   
 
Figure 5 
Share of countries in inflation crisis: 1800-2008 
High income vs. Middle and Low income 
 
Sample coverage: 67 countries (23 high income and 44 middle and low income countries) that were 
independent in the given year.  
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited therein and authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Whereas figure 5 is illustrative of the frequency of very high inflation 
episodes, we note that it does not capture episodes of sustained high inflation below 
20% that, if significantly unanticipated and depending on the maturity structure of 
government debt, may represent a substantial de facto default on domestic debt. 
Figure 6 on banking crises tells a very different story (our data for developing 
countries begins more recently; hence the dashed line for middle and low income only 
begin in the 1860s; of course, many of today’s developing countries did not gain their 



























inflation crises, banking crises are “an equal opportunity menace”  (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2009, chapter 10).  Although banking crises have picked up dramatically in 
emerging markets since 1980, they have recently picked up in rich countries as well.  
Again, note the hiatus in banking crises across both groups of countries during the 
years of financial repression from World War II until the 1970s. 
Clearly, neither high nor middle and low income countries are in imminent danger of 
graduating from banking crises. 
 
Figure 6 
Share of countries in banking crisis: 1800-2008 
High income vs. Middle and Low income 
 
Sample coverage: 67 countries (23 high income and 44 middle and low income countries) that were 
independent in the given year.  






























1.5 The interval between consecutive crises 
Having presented evidence on the incidence of crises, we next examine the 
duration of tranquil times or the interval between crises.  
In our first pass here, we do not make any attempt to deal with the possible 
non-stationarity of the time series, and take simple averages.  In particular, we do not 
deal with the possible structural breaks that occur at World War II, when default and 
banking crises frequencies sharply increased; in the early 1970s, when they rose 
again; and in the 1990s when inflation crises frequencies fell dramatically.   From the 
broader sweep of history, it is not easy to determine what constitutes a structural 
break, but clearly further analysis is needed.  It should also be noted that in the main 
text, we present only unconditional measures of lulls between crises; institutions and 
political stability are no doubt extremely important. Yet, many of these factors, too, 
are highly persistent and difficult to measure, which is precisely why previous 
experience with crises is such a powerful predictor of future ones.9  (We do present 
hazard analysis results in the Appendix B, which in principle allow for conditioning 
on a broader range of variables.) 
In figure 7, we look at the frequency distribution of “tranquil” periods, how 
long before one crisis episode stops and the next crisis starts.  The figure gives the 
statistics separately for external default, inflation and banking crises.  The frequencies 
shown are conditional on having had at least one crisis of a particular type over 1800-
2008. Of the 66 countries in our sample, 65 had at least one systemic banking crisis; 
64 had at least one inflation crisis; and 50 had at least one sovereign default on 
                                                        
9 Again, Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) provide 
concrete empirical measures of how past crises experience measures a country’s vulnerability 




external debt.10 The conditional frequency distributions are similar, with a significant 
share of distribution falling between ten and twenty years.    
The conditional frequency of recidivism (conditional on a crisis recurring) is 
broadly similar across different types of crises. Twenty years without a default, 
banking or inflation crisis is hardly evidence of “graduation”.  But it does appear to be 
a notable break, where the odds of recidivism over any medium term period, drop 
notably.   As already mentioned and as documented in Table A1 as well as figure A1, 
the duration of default crises is much longer than of inflation or banking crises. 
As the inset highlights, conditional on having had at least one crisis, the 
percent of no reversal cases is significantly higher for default (7 percent) than for 
banking or inflation crises. If the 16 countries that never had an external default in the 
first place were counted in this tally the “graduation” or no reversal percentage gap 








10 Mauritius is the only country to have avoided a systemic banking crisis altogether; New 




Figure 7  
Duration of “tranquil times” conditional on having had at least one crisis 
Frequency distribution (in percent): 1800-2008 
 
Note: Duration of tranquil time is calculated as number of years between end year of a crisis and start 
of a new crisis. For example: Argentina had defaulted in 1982 and it didn’t resolve it until 1994. In 
2001 Argentina entered into default crisis again. In this case the tranquil time for Argentina was 
between 1994 and 2001. The main figure shows the frequency distribution of years between two crises 
(or number of years reversals took place). The inset smaller figure shows the frequency distribution of 
crises that have not reversed (for a period of more than 50 years). For each type of crisis, we count the 
number of crisis episodes that have reversed and those that haven’t for more than 50 years; then we 
calculate the duration of tranquil time when crisis was reversed and finally we calculate the frequency 
distribution. For example: 77% of inflation crises were reversed within 20 years; 4% of inflation crises 
were not reversed.  
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited therein and authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Figures 8-10 illustrate the distribution of time between crises using a 
histogram, and distinguishing between high and middle and low income countries.  
The charts give a more nuanced picture of the differences between crises than the 
world aggregates do.  The “no reversal” bars denote cases where at least 50 years has 




dramatically different results.11   For external defaults, figure 8 illustrates that whereas 
most emerging market recurrences happen within twenty years (two decades is an 
important marker), only few countries that have once defaulted have avoided any 
further defaults, at least not long enough to pass the 50-year filter we use.  For 
inflation and banking crises, the twenty year mark contains an even larger percentage 
of reversals and, at the same time, the cases of no reversal are scarce.  
Since many crises happen during and episodes of war and civil unrest, one 
might reasonably ask whether excluding these events dramatically affects recidivism 
rates or the difference between advanced and middle and low income economies.  In 
the appendix A, we reproduce figures 7 and 8 excluding episodes surrounding severe 
wars (deaths greater than 0.8% of population). The results are little affected, as is the 
case for the other figures.  We also checked a milder war filter (deaths greater than 
0.29% of the population), again without substantially changing the results.  In any 
event, given the risk of war is a major factor surrounding default risk, and that 
propensity to wage war is an important risk to creditors, it is not entirely clear that this 
measure is more meaningful than the simpler one of the text; further study is needed. 
                                                        
11 The bars in figures 7-9 add to less than 100% because they excludes episodes where there 





Figure 8  
External default crises: Duration of “tranquil time”   
conditional on having had at least one crisis 
Frequency distribution (in percent): 1800-2008 
High vs. Middle and Low income 
 
 
Note: Duration of tranquil time is calculated as number of years between two consecutive default 
episodes. The end of a default episode is considered as the year the country regains access to the capital 
market. In other words, as long as the country is excluded from the international capital market, it is not 
considered as having resolved its default crisis.  The start of a new default episode is the year the 
country declares default on its external debt.   
For each income group, we count the number of external default episodes that have reversed and those 
that haven’t for more than 50 years; then we calculate the duration of tranquil time when default was 
reversed and finally we calculate the frequency distribution. For example: for high income group, 40% 
of default crises were reversed within 20 years and 30% of default crises were not reversed.   The bars 
do not sum to 100% because the cutoff excludes cases where the last default occurred within 50 years 
but there has been no second default.) 
Sample coverage: 167 episodes of default crisis with reversal and 12 episodes with no reversal. 









































Number of years between two defaults 




Figure 9  
Inflation crises: Duration of “tranquil time”  
conditional on having had at least one crisis 
Frequency distribution (in percent): 1800-2008 
High vs. Middle and Low income 
 
Note: Duration of tranquil time is calculated as number of years between two consecutive inflation 
crises.  
For each income group, we count the number of inflation crisis episodes that have reversed and those 
that haven’t for more than 50 years; then we calculate the duration of tranquil time when inflation crisis 
was reversed and finally we calculate the frequency distribution. For example: for high income group, 
68% of inflation crises were reversed within 20 years and 8% of inflation crises were not reversed.  
Sample coverage: 404 episodes of inflation crisis with reversals and 17 episodes with no reversal. 
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Banking crises: Duration of “tranquil time”  
conditional on having had at least one crisis 
Frequency distribution (in percent): 1800-2008 
High vs. Middle and Low income 
 
Note: Duration of tranquil time is calculated as number of years between two consecutive banking 
crisis episodes.  
For each income group, we count the number of banking crisis episodes that have reversed and those 
that haven’t for more than 50 years; then we calculate the duration of tranquil time when banking crisis 
was reversed and finally we calculate the frequency distribution. For example: for high income group, 
70% of banking crises were reversed within 20 years and 5% of banking crises were not reversed.  
Sample coverage: 195 episodes of banking crisis with reversals and 7 episodes with no reversal. 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), sources cited therein and authors’ calculations. 
 
1.6 Time since last crisis 
To gain a deeper insight into recidivism – or its complement, graduation -- we 
look at measures of distance since the last crisis.  In figure 11, three countries, the 
United States, Denmark and the United Kingdom have been independent the entire 
post-1800 period and never defaulted on external debt.  (Although as we have already 
noted, the US and UK did effectively default on domestic debt by going off the gold 
standard in the early 1930s; Denmark also defaulted on domestic debt in 1813 at the 
70 


































Number of years between two banking crises 




end of the Napoleonic Wars).  At the other extreme, a number of African countries 
remain in default today. 
Stunningly, the median time since last default is just over a century for the 
advance countries (105 years) versus only 14 years for the developing countries.  The 
world median is 23 years.  
Figure 12 on inflation crises tells a similar story with the median again being 
only fifteen years for the middle and low income countries, but 59 years for high 
income countries.  Many high income countries, of course, had high inflation in the 
years after World War II, so the average time is lower than for default. 
Finally, for banking crises, the difference between income groups is even 
smaller.  Notice that even prior to the crisis, the distinction between high income 
countries and the rest of the world is not as large as for other type of crises. See figure 
13 and table 4. 
 
Table 4- Medians of distance (in years) to last crisis in 2010 
 
Type of crisis World  High income  Middle and low income 
External 
default 23 
 105  14 
Inflation 19  59  15 
Banking 12  9  12 
Notes: distance to last crisis is calculated as 2010 minus either the last year that the country was 
in crisis, 1800 or year of independence. Medians are calculated for each income group and each 
type of crisis. 
Sample coverage: 66 countries (23 high income and 43 middle and low income countries) for 
external default, inflation and banking crisis. 




Figure 11  
Time elapsed by 2010 since last external default crisis, 1800 or year of 
independence: High vs. Middle and Low income 
 
Note: distance calculated as 2010 minus either the last year that the country was in external default 
crisis, 1800 or year of independence. 
Sample coverage: 66 countries (23 high income and 43 middle and low income countries). 






Time elapsed by 2010 since last inflation crisis, 1800 or year of independence:  
High vs. Middle and Low income 
 
 
Note: distance calculated as 2010 minus either the last year that the country was in inflation crisis, 1800 
or year of independence. 
Sample coverage: 66 countries (23 high income and 43 middle and low income countries). 







Time elapsed by 2010 since the last banking crisis, 1800 or year of independence: 
High vs. Middle and Low income 
 
Note: distance is calculated as 2010 minus either the last year that the country was in banking crisis, 
1800 or year of independence. 
Sample coverage: 66 countries (23 high income and 43 middle and low income countries).  






1.7 Macroeconomic volatility 
What are the reasons why, at least until the recent global financial meltdown, 
financial crises have become less prevalent, especially in high income countries?  
Certainly, one possible reason was the general drop in macroeconomic volatility that 
took place particularly in the rich countries, that is the great moderation, as figure 14 
illustrates, particularly the drop in volatility from the 1980s in advanced countries and 
from the 1990s in emerging markets.  The table also illustrates, however, that our 
warnings about “early celebrations” for declaring countries to have graduated from 
financial crises may also apply to the Great Moderation.  The decline in volatility 
from the 1970s may be as much due to a spike in the 1970s as due to great moderation 
after.  The 1950s were also a period of relatively low volatility.  In any event, it is 
clear that emerging markets face higher volatility than advanced countries.   
Acemoglu et al. (2003) “Institutional causes, macroeconomic symptoms: 
volatility, crises and growth” argue that countries that inherited more ‘‘extractive’’ 
institutions from their colonial past were more likely to experience high volatility, 
lower growth rate and more economic crises during the postwar period.  This is an 
interesting hypothesis that merits further research, also on the difficulties of 
graduation.  We note that countries with extractive resources are more likely to face 
very high terms of trade volatility and face higher risk of default for this reason as 
well, see Catao (2009).) Aguiar, Amador and Gopinath (2010) argue that credibility 
problems may endogenously create greater persistence in productivity shocks in 
emerging markets, while one can also make the case that the countries with abundant 
natural resources are more likely to experience a generalized tragedy of the commons 




(1999). The institutional failure of coordinating interests of different power groups 
might be another reason why some countries, facing similar external shocks, are more 
prone to default than others, as it is modeled in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  Figure 15 
suggests that indeed, higher volatility in emerging market growth is not simply due to 
terms of trade volatility, as advanced country commodity exporters have experienced 
dramatically greater drops in volatility than emerging markets over the recent period. 
 
Figure 14 
Evolution of GDP growth rate volatility: 1950-2006 
High vs. Middle and Low income 
 
Notes: For each country the volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of its growth rate during 
the 10 years interval.  
Sample coverage: 66 countries (23 high income and 43 middle and low income countries) that were 
independent in the given year.  
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Evolution of GDP growth rate volatility: 1950-2006 
Commodities exporting countries: Emerging vs. Benchmark 
 
Notes: For each country the volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of its growth rate during 
the 10 years interval.  
Benchmark: Australia and New Zealand. Emerging economies: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Columbia, Cote d’Ivoire, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, South 
Africa, Thailand, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
Source: Maddison (2004), Total Economy Database (2008). 
 
Similar patterns to those illustrated in figures 14 and 15 emerge using swing12 of GDP 
growth rate instead of volatilities.  
 
                                                        
12 Calculated as the average swing of each group. For each country the swing is calculated as the 































1.8 Crisis and Role of IMF programs: 1952-2007 
We next turn to look at IMF programs.  The presence of the IMF constitutes a 
major structural change.  As emphasized by Bordo and Eichengreen (1999), crises 
have been more frequent but shorter since the advent of the IMF. What is interesting 
is how often the introduction of the IMF program does not necessarily halt the 
ultimate crisis.  A famous example is Argentina, which received large (as a share of 
GDP) bailout packages in 2000 and again in 2001, but nevertheless went ahead and 
defaulted in 2002. But the case of Argentina is hardly exceptional as Table 5 
illustrates. 
During 1952-2008, there were in total 85 default episodes and 538 IMF 
programs. If one restricts attention to cases where IMF programs were implemented 
1-2 years before the crisis, we have 36 cases, or 42% of all default episodes. 
 Finally, in figure 16, we graph the incidence of IMF programs across 
advanced and emerging economies. The United Kingdom famously called repeatedly 
on IMF help, but so too did many other advanced economies until the early 1980s.  So 
it is important to recognize that even though countries “graduated” from external 







Table 5- Examples of cases where IMF programs are introduced but there is 
subsequent default 
















India 1958 1957 3/11/57 3/10/58 72.5 
Chile 1961 1959 4/1/59 12/31/59 8.1 
  1961 2/16/61 2/15/62 75 
 1963 1963 1/15/63 1/14/64 40 
 1966 1964 2/14/64 1/15/65 25 
Costa Rica 1962 1961 10/4/61 10/3/62 15 
 1981 1980 3/12/80 6/16/81 60.5 
Paraguay 1968 1966 9/1/66 8/31/67 7.5 
Peru 1969 1967 8/18/67 8/17/68 42.5 
 1978 1977 11/18/77 9/14/78 90 
 1980 1978 9/15/78 8/9/79 32.2 
  1979 8/10/79 12/31/80 285 
 1983 1982 6/7/82 4/26/84 650 
Turkey 1982 1980 6/18/80 6/17/83 1250 
Panama 1983 1982 4/28/82 4/27/83 29.7 
Uruguay 1983 1983 4/22/83 4/21/85 378 
 1987 1985 9/27/85 3/26/87 122.9 
 2003 2002 4/1/02 3/18/03 1988.3 
Guatemala 1989 1988 10/26/88 2/28/90 54 
Venezuela 1990 1989 6/23/89 3/22/93 3703.1 
Indonesia 1998 1997 11/5/97 8/25/98 8338.2 
 2002 2000 2/4/00 1/29/02 3638 
Argentina 2001 2000 3/10/00 1/23/03 16936.8 
Dom 











Source: Reinhart (2010). 
 
1.9 Graduation and the Theory of Sovereign Default 
 Having now given a quantitative overview of the remarkable serial nature of 
sovereign default, banking and inflation crises, what does theory about graduation?  
Since by far the most striking empirical differences between advanced economies and 
middle and low income countries are for sovereign debt, we will focus mainly on this 
question. 
 At one level, the inferior performance of middle and low income countries is 
easy to explain.  Emerging market countries face deeper and more permanent shocks 




procyclical macroeconomic policy, as Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004) 
document.  During periods of surges in global capital flows, emerging markets rush in 
with a plethora of supposedly high return projects, at the risk of being stuck with 
incomplete, illiquid investments if capital flows reverse or capital evaporates.  
Corruption and the influence of interest groups is another important factor in 
developing countries that can undermine fiscal stability and potentially over 
borrowing as it is showed in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  France’s status as a centuries 
long serial defaulter during its years of monarchy has often been blamed on the 
government’s failure to establish a rationale and orderly system of centralized tax 
collection (see MacDonald, 2006).  Clearly, “graduation” if it can be achieved is also 
linked to a country’s institutions and not just its level of wealth. 
 At another level, explaining graduation is quite difficult, because standard 
models of default (following Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981) do not necessarily suggest 
that richer countries should be able to borrow more (as a percent of their income) or 
that they should necessarily be less prone to default.  As detailed in Obstfeld and 
Rogoff, the key penalty to default in the canonical model is a cutoff from international 
capital markets and an inability to smooth national consumption through international 
markets.  As Obsteld and Rogoff show, the calibration of the costs to default is quite 
similar to that of Lucas (1988) on the gains to smoothing out business cycles.  
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, p. 369) find that, in fact, the empirical cost of exclusion 
from international markets is considerably greater for emerging markets than for rich 
countries.  Admittedly, the canonical models illustrate model implicit contracts, so the 
issue of actual default is left in the background. Bulow and Rogoff (1989a) and 




verifiable, then optimal contracts may call for a premium in good states of nature, and 
negotiate partial default in bad states of nature, depending on the two sides’ relative 
bargaining power.  In any event, the fact that actual insolvency is seldom an issue in 
sovereign debt contracts, and that willingness to pay is invariably the binding 
constraint, underscores the point that countries cannot be expected to graduate simply 
by virtue of growing richer. 
 Of course, one way countries can graduate from default on external debt is by 
borrowing entirely (or almost entirely) through domestically administered markets.  
As Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) show, domestic debt has long been a quite important 
source of debt for most countries in the world, even though this fact has not been 
widely recognized. Also contrary to conventional belief, there are many cases of 
outright default on domestic debt (Reinhart and Rogoff document over seventy). 
Some of these defaults involved breaking indexation clauses (to inflation, gold, etc.), 
but in some cases, countries prefer outright default on domestic debt to achieve the 
same end through inflation. 
 In general, the fact that rich countries tend to have far fewer problems with 
serial default, most likely traces to collateral outside the usual type considered in the 
literature (see Cole and Kehoe, 1995 or Bulow and Rogoff, 1989b, for discussions of 
possible collateral outside the direct risk sharing gains from financial integration.  For 
example, a breakdown in debt payments can spill over into reputation in trade 
relationships.)  Another factor, of course, is that richer countries with better developed 
domestic credit markets are in position to rely far less on external financing, which in 




 At the other extreme are models of banking and financial crises that certainly 
do not suggest any reason why richer countries should be less prone.  As already 
noted, Schularick and Taylor (2009) argue that even where greater macroeconomic 
and policy stability ought to ensure a more stable environment and fewer crisis, the 
financial system may expand to become crisis prone, offsetting the benefits of greater 
stability.   
 Thus, in addition to needing a better theory of serial default on sovereign 
external debt and a country’s ultimate “graduation,” it is also important to better 




In this paper, we have taken at trying to quantify and better understand 
countries ‘risks of recidivism for different types of financial crises, and the duration of 
time that must pass before one can consider a country to have “graduated.”   Twenty 
years without a crisis is an important marker, but the tails of the recidivism 
distribution are very large.  Countries do seem to graduate from external default 
crises, although further study is required to understand how much this is due to 
greater institutional and macroeconomic stability, and how much is due to enhanced 
ability to partially default in other ways (eg, inflation and financial repression), 
especially as advanced countries are typically able to finance a far larger share of their 
debt under domestic law and in domestic currency. Of course, if one also includes 
borrowing under duress from the International Monetary Fund as a measure of debt 




default crisis is less convincing. Graduation from inflation crises is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, and here the evidence on graduation is suggestive but less decisive.  
Banking crises are a completely different animal; there is no compelling evidence that 
any country has outgrown them.  However, the very low rate of banking crises that 
occurred between the end of World War II and the break-up of Bretton Woods at the 









 There is a striking difference between the incidence of sovereign debt crisis in 
advanced economies and middle- and low-income countries. The average sovereign 
default probability of high-income countries is 7% over the past two centuries, less 
than half of middle- and low-income countries, 17%, and almost one-fifth of Latin 
America countries, 34%. See Chapter 1 of this thesis. Standard theoretical models like 
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) do not offer explanations about why rich countries have 
less incentive to default on their external debt than middle- and low-income countries. 
The fact that Latin America countries defaulted more times than other countries that 
presumably faced similar external shocks and were at a similar stage of development, 
suggests that factors other than macroeconomic fundamentals may be important in 
determining countries’ likelihoods of default, for example, political factors.  
 The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we present an empirical analysis 
to show: 1) a negative correlation between institutional quality and frequency of 
sovereign defaults, and 2) the particular institutional feature that matters for sovereign 
debt occurrence is the degree of government polarization. The second objective is to 
provide a theory of sovereign default that takes into account institutions. Countries 
with good institutions are characterized by well-developed legal structures that make 




central planner maximizes collective welfare by setting economy-wide expenditure 
and debt.  In contrast, countries with bad institutions are characterized by a lack of 
barriers to limit the influence of powerful groups in the government decision-making 
process. Powerful groups act in a non-cooperative manner; they behave in ways that 
are better from their own point of view, without taking into account the effect of their 
actions on other groups.13 Under this situation, the more polarized the groups are, the 
larger the size the inefficiency will be.  
 A two-period model is derived to demonstrate that regardless of the degree of 
polarization of government, in countries with good institutions, default probabilities 
are lower than in countries with bad institutions. In addition, we show that when there 
are bad institutions, the likelihood of default increases with the degree of polarization. 
The model is then extended to an infinite horizon setup adopting the standard 
sovereign default framework. Numerical simulations are able to explain a large part of 
the cross-country difference in sovereign default frequencies observed in the data. 
 This paper is related to both the politico-institutional and the sovereign default 
literature. In the politico-institutional literature, there is a set of papers that studies the 
role of institutions on shaping macroeconomic policies that ultimately explain the 
cross-country differences in growth, output volatilities and vulnerability to crisis. 
Acemoglu et al. (2003) argued that countries pursuing poor macroeconomic policies 
also have weak institutions. Kraay and Nehru (2004) found the quality of policies and 
institutions are an important determinant of debt distress. In this paper, the particular 
                                                        
13 Argentina is a clear example of uncoordinated behavior among several public agencies, 




institutional quality that we focus on is the influence of powerful groups on the policy 
determination and the degree of polarization in the government. 
 Another set of papers studied how budgetary institutions affect fiscal and debt 
policy. Von Hagen (1992) and Stein, Talvi and Gruisanti (1998) argued that budget 
institutions matter because they can affect the rules of the game under which political 
agents interact. They find that countries with better budgetary institutions display 
relatively smaller fiscal deficits and public debt. We do not model the budgetary 
process; we simply assume that bad budgetary institutions allow powerful groups to 
influence government policies.  
Aizenman (1993), Von Hagen and Harden (1995) and Velasco (1999) studied 
the role of interest groups in shaping macroeconomic policies. In their models, 
government resources are a “common property” out of which interest groups can 
finance expenditure on their preferred items. Knowing that at least part of the cost 
would be borne by others, interest groups are tempted to overspend and over-borrow. 
Therefore, if fiscal policy is decided in a decentralized manner, a negative externality 
arises. In our model, the negative externality comes from the fact that groups do not 
internalize the full cost of engaging more debt reflected in the risk premium the 
country has to pay in the international capital market, and when a group chooses to 
default, it forces the country (all groups) to default. 
The paper is also related to works that examine the role of polarization in 
macroeconomic policies. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) argued that polarization leads 
to over-accumulation of public debt because the current government has different 
preferences on spending than their opponent. Hence, when it borrows it does not 




power to the opponent group. Alesina and Drazen (1991) showed that polarization 
leads to higher deficit and debt because it delays stabilization. In both papers there is 
no default. In our paper, we model default decision that is affected by government 
polarization. More polarization leads to higher default probabilities because the more 
polarized the groups are, the higher the default costs not internalized by the defaulting 
group will be. Therefore, more defaults occur in equilibrium.  
Studies of sovereign defaults pioneered by Eaton and Gertsovitz (1981) and 
followed by recent quantitative models such as Aguiar and Gopinah (2006), Arellano 
(2008), Mendoza and Yue (2008), among others, have modeled default episodes as an 
equilibrium outcome in which creditors agree to offer debt contracts even in cases 
when defaults are possible outcomes. These papers provide a framework to study 
sovereign defaults but do not provide reasons why some countries default 
considerably more times than others given similar fundamentals.  
Recent works of Hatchondo, Martinez and Sapriza (2008) and D’Erasmo 
(2010) take a political economy approach. In their models, international lenders face 
different types of borrowers. Policymakers of the borrowing country have different 
degrees of impatience and they alternate in power. Lenders cannot directly observe a 
borrower’s type, and hence have to infer from borrower’s actions. Our paper differs 
from these in two ways. First, we do not assume that the default decision depends on 
the policymaker in power. In our model the policymaker in place, the number of 
powerful groups and their relative powers in the government are important, but they 
do not determine the ultimate outcome. What is essential in our model is the 




focus on explaining the cross-country difference in terms of sovereign default 
frequencies rather than matching a particular country’s data, as these papers do.  
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we provide details of the 
data used in our cross-country empirical analysis and show the findings. In Section 
3.3, we present a two-period model with an option to default in period two. We show 
that in countries with bad institutions default is more likely. Furthermore, the default 
probability increases with the degree of government polarization. In Section 3.4, we 
embed the two-period model into an infinite horizon framework. In Section 3.5 we 
compare simulation results to the data. Section 3.6 concludes the paper.  
 
2.2 Data and Findings 
 In this section we document the cross-country differences in terms of 
institutional quality and external default incidence, and establish the facts we aim to 
explain using the models that we will develop in sections 3 and 4. The dataset covers 
more than 80 countries. It includes measures of institutional quality, frequencies of 
sovereign default and economic indicators from 1960 to 2008.14 
 
2.2.1 Data Description and Source 
 We use three market assessment measures of institutional quality: the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) institutional index, the Government 
Effectiveness and the Control for Corruption.  The ICRG institutional index from the 
PRS Group is based on investors’ evaluation regarding the rule of law, bureaucratic 
                                                        
14 Our main dataset spans from 1960 to 2008. However, we use sovereign default crisis data 




quality, corruption, expropriation risk, and government repudiation of contracts. It 
ranges from 0 to 1, with high values representing better institutions. The Government 
Effectiveness index captures the degree of a government’s independence from 
political pressures, and the Control for Corruption index measures the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, as well as the influence of elites and private 
interests in policymaking. Both measures are from the World Bank Governance 
Matters VIII, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009).15 They range from -2.5 to 2.5, 
the higher being the better. 
 A caveat of these measures is that they tend to be correlated with income level 
rather than simply reflect durable institutional constraints in the government. A 
potential problem of using only these measures as independent explanatory variables 
to analyze default probabilities is that they might already contain information about 
past defaults. Furthermore these measures reflect the perception of the market about 
the overall quality of the institutions in a country, therefore we can learn little about 
which aspect of the government is relevant to determine the default risk. With the 
purpose of finding the particular government feature that matters for debt policies, we 
explore two underlying characteristics of the government structure: government 
fragmentation and government polarization. To capture government fragmentation, 
we use government fractionalization: the probability of two randomly chosen deputies 
in the government belonging to different parties. A higher value will indicate a larger 
number of political parties in the government. Following Franzese (2008), 
government polarization is calculated as the weighted standard deviation of ideologies 
of the three largest parties in the government, where the weight given to each party is 
                                                        




its voting share in the legislature. A higher index implies higher polarization. The data 
source for both government fragmentation and government polarization is the 
Database of Political Institutions (2009). Data on sovereign defaults are from Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009). Default probability for each country is calculated as the number of 
sovereign default episodes that occurred between 1960 and 2008 divided by the 
number of years since 1960 (or year of independence). For countries’ default history, 
we use the number of default episodes that occurred between 1800 (or year of 
independence) and 1959. Additional control variables include the log of average real 
GDP per capita in 1990 international Geary-Khami dollars between 1970 and 2007 
from the Maddison database, and the average debt to Gross National Income (GNI) 
ratio between 1970 and 2008 from the Global Development Finance database. 
 An obvious objection to this research strategy, trying to explain default risk 
with institutions, is that institutions are themselves endogenous.  In particular 
institutions may be changed as a result of unsatisfactory economic performance, for 
example, after an economic collapse. If this is the case, institutions cannot be used as 
explanatory variables in analysis where crisis incidence in the variable trying to be 
explained. However institutions are costly to change, and hence they are changed 
relatively infrequently, they can be considered “exogenous” at least in the short to 
medium run (See Alessina and Perotti (1996) for discussion). 
 
2.2.2 Facts 
 The main objective of this paper is to explain why some countries default on 
its external debt more times than other countries. The key findings using the dataset 




Fact 1: Institutional quality and sovereign default probability are negatively 
correlated.  
Countries with good institutions rarely default. Figures 17 to 19 show the negative 
relationship between our three measures of institutional quality and sovereign default 
probability. The correlation of sovereign default probability with ICRG institutional 
index, government effectiveness and control of corruption is -0.39, -0.36 and -0.37, 
respectively. They are all significant at 5%.  
 
Figures 17- Default Probability versus ICRG institutional index 
 




































Figures 18- Default Probability versus Government Effectiveness 
 
Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project, Reinhart & Rogoff (2009). 
 
 
Figures 19- Default Probability versus Control for Corruption 
 
























































Table 6 reports the summary statistics of institutional quality of non-defaulters, one-
time defaulters and serial defaulters. Non-defaulters, countries that have not defaulted 
during this period, have a substantially higher index in all three measures of 
institutions than defaulters, and there is no big difference between one-time defaulters 
and serial defaulters.16 
 
Table 6- Summary Statistics of Institutional Quality and Default Probability 





Non-defaulters 0.75 1.23 1.15 
Defaulter 0.42 -0.42 -0.46 
     One-time Defaulters 0.42 -0.46 -0.45 
     Serial Defaulters* 0.43 -0.38 -0.48 
* Countries that had two or more default episodes. 
Samples size: 118 countries, 30 non-defaulters, 50 one-time defaulter and 38 serial defaulters. 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project, World Bank and The PRS Group, 
Reinhart & Rogoff (2009). 
 
Fact 2: High government polarization is associated with high default 
probabilities. 
Figures 20 and 21 show that government fragmentation is not positively correlated 
with default probability, but government polarization is.17 The correlation between 
default probability and government fragmentation is 0.02 and it is not significant. The 




16  We perform the mean test to check if the sample mean are significantly different. The null 
hypothesis is that the sample means of the two groups are equal. Comparing defaulters to 
non-defaulters, for all three measures, we reject the null hypothesis at 5 percent significance 
level, thus we conclude that means are unequal. Comparing one-time defaulters to serial 
defaulters, we could not reject the null hypothesis, so we conclude they are equal.  
 
17 There is empirical evidence that shows higher fragmentation is associated with higher fiscal 




Figures 20- Default Probability versus Fragmentation 
 
Source: DPI (2009), Reinhart & Rogoff (2009). 
 
 
Figures 21- Default Probability versus Polarization 
 
























































Table 7 reports the corresponding summary statistics. Defaulters and non-defaulters 
differ largely in their degree of government polarization, 0.17 versus 0.10. 
Furthermore, serial defaulters’ degree of government polarization (0.22) is two times 
that of one-time defaulters’ (0.11). 18   This suggests that a more fragmented 
government (i.e., more players in the decision process) does not necessarily imply 
more defaults; but a more polarized government is associated with higher default risk. 
A possible explanation for the positive correlation between polarization and default 
probability is that polarization leads to coordination failure between parties in the 
government regarding macroeconomic policies, in particular, debt policies. As a 
consequence, countries with more polarization are more likely to default than others 
given the same types of external shocks.  
 
Table 7- Summary Statistics of Government Characteristics and Default 
Probability 
  Government fragmentation 
Government 
polarization 
Non-defaulters 0.23 0.10 
Defaulters 0.16 0.17 
     One-time Defaulters 0.15 0.11 
     Serial Defaulters* 0.17 0.22 
* Countries that had two or more default episodes. 
Samples size: 118 countries, 30 non-defaulters, 50 one-time defaulter and 38 serial defaulters. 
Source: Database of Political Institutions (2009), Reinhart & Rogoff (2009). 
 
 One can argue that there might be omitted variables that can explain cross-
country differences, both institutional quality and default frequencies; for example, 
                                                        
18  We perform the mean test to check if the sample mean are significantly different. The null 
hypothesis is that the sample means of the two groups are equal. Comparing defaulters to 
non-defaulters and then one-time defaulter to serial defaulters in term of government 
fragmentation, in both tests we could not reject the null hypothesis. In the case of government 
polarization, comparing defaulters to non-defaulters and then one-time defaulter to serial 




stage of development. This is a valid argument since most advanced economies enjoy 
better institutions and rarely default. Indeed, the correlation between real GDP per 
capita and default probability is -0.29, significant at 5%. Another issue is that if a 
country does not have external debt, either because it does not need to borrow abroad 
or it has no access to foreign funding, its sovereign default probability will be zero. In 
fact, countries with higher external debt as percent of GNI are also those that default 
more often. The average external debt to GNI ratio of non-defaulters is 0.16 while the 
average of defaulters is 0.76. Finally, countries that have defaulted in the past are 
more likely to default again in the future. As discussed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2005), 
history matters and one possible explanation is the inertia of institutions. Adopting 
this interpretation, past defaults should be seen as symptoms of deeper institutional 
failures and not just contemporaneous policies or external shocks. The market 
penalizes countries with default records by charging them a higher risk premium, 
which will in turn exacerbate the vulnerabilities of these countries.  
 Taking into account these issues, we perform a regression analysis including 
as explanatory variable real GDP per capita, external debt to GNI ratio and default 
history. Table 8 reports the OLS cross-country regression analysis. Columns 1-3 use 
market assessment measures of countries’ institutional qualities. They are all 
significant at 5% with the expected negative sign indicating that countries with better 
institutions are less likely to default. As we argued before, these institutional quality 
measures tend to improve with income level and may contain information about past 
defaults. Not surprisingly, both real GDP per capita and default history are not 
significant in column 1-3. When we use government fragmentation in column 4, 




income countries are associated with low default probabilities, and countries with 
default histories tend to default more times.  
 When we introduce government fragmentation, it has the expected positive 
sign. Having more parties in the government is associated with higher default 
probabilities, but the coefficient is not significant. However, when we interact 
government fragmentation with government polarization, fragmentation becomes 
significant.19  This suggests that government fragmentation is a relevant determinant 
of default probability only in the presence of some degree of government polarization. 
We can interpret this result as the following: in the absence of polarization, an 
increase in the number of participants in the decision-making process does not imply 
a suboptimal decision about repaying or repudiating the debt.  It is only when there is 
a fundamental difference between parties, measured by ideological polarization, that 
parties fail to coordinate on debt policy resulting in higher default risk.  In Columns 6-
10, we include government polarization as an explanatory variable. The coefficients 
are of the expected positive sign, significant at 1%. In column 10, we include both the 
overall measure of the institutional quality (ICRG) and government polarization; they 
are both significant. From this analysis, we conclude that countries with better 
institutions default less. Furthermore, controlling for the quality of institutions, 
countries with higher government polarization default more times.  In the model that 
we will develop in the next section, both elements are important in determining the 
default risk.   
                                                        
19 The interaction term is constructed as the product of government fragmentation and a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one when there is some degree of polarization (i.e., 




Table 8 - Cross-country regression of sovereign default risk and institutions 
 
 
2.2.3 Discussion  
 From the empirical analysis, we conclude that institutions and default are 
correlated.  Our insight is that many countries are plagued by weak institutional 
environment. Spending and borrowing decisions are often the result of negotiation 
within politico-business elite. Such powerful groups can be political leaders, 
provincial governments, labor unions, parastatal enterprises and financial backers of 
the ruling government. The determination of macro policies in such an economy 
depends on the interaction between these groups. Unless these groups perfectly 
cooperate, this interaction need not result in collective efficient outcomes.  
 An example of a country with these characteristics is Argentina, the most 
decentralized country in Latin America, with approximately 50% of total public 




fiscal imbalance. From 1985 to 1995, two-thirds of provincial expenditures were 
financed by taxes collected by the central government through the federal tax-sharing 
agreement. Provinces have wide autonomy in deciding the financing of their 
expenditures with the guarantee of the central government, both domestically and 
abroad. The fact that bonds emitted by the provinces are guaranteed by the central 
government with the national tax revenue, an increase of provincial debts indirectly 
increases the level of national debt.20  During 1996-2000, provincial public debt 
increased by $8.4 billions pesos, that is an expansion of 8.9% per year, 3.5 times the 
average annual GDP growth rate during the same period. Argentina had the largest 
default in history in 2001. Several factors lead to this crisis. We argue that the 
perverse incentives created by a system of tax centralization, spending and financing 
decentralization played an important role in making Argentina one of the world’s 
leading serial defaulter in the modern history.  
 We build a model where powerful groups and lenders choose their actions 
optimally, taking the institutional quality of the country as given. We demonstrate that 
the default probability depends both on the institutional quality and the degree of 
polarization. Polarization in the model is captured by the distribution of shares of 
government resources allocated to the groups.21 In countries with good institutions, 
even if there are many powerful groups, social optimal allocation for government 
consumption and borrowing is achieved because the central planner maximizes the 
                                                        
20 Saiegh & Tommasi (1999) and Argañaraz et al. (2001). 
 
21  Woo (2003) used income distribution to measure polarization. When we use the GINI 
coefficient instead of ideological difference in the governing parties for our empirical 
analysis, the positive relationship between polarization and default probabilities is preserved. 
Therefore, assuming that more unequal distribution of government resources implies more 




aggregate welfare. In countries with bad institutions, powerful groups do not 
coordinate with each other; instead, each group optimizes independently how much to 
spend and borrow at a level that is suboptimal from the point of view of the country 
overall. The negative externality in this case is due to the fact that each group 
internalizes only its own cost of borrowing, which is lower than the aggregate cost. 
We want to emphasize that political fragmentation (i.e., having numerous political 
parties) is not problem; it is the interplay of having bad institutions and a polarized 
government that ultimately define a country’s likelihood to default on its external 
debt.  
 
2.3 A Simple Theory of Government Polarization and Default 
Probability  
 To study the relationship between the frequency of sovereign default, 
institutions and government polarization, we first build a two-period model with four 
assumptions: 1) there are n powerful groups that would like to influence government’s 
spending and borrowing decisions. Powerful groups’ income sources come from 
government transfers. These groups can only save and borrow through the central 
government. 2) We take the institutional quality of the country as exogenous. 
Countries with good institutions are those that there is a well-developed legal 
structure exist to limit the influence of powerful groups on central government fiscal 
and debt decisions. In this case a central planner’s solution that maximizes collective 
welfare is achieved regardless the degree of polarization. We will call this the unified 
government case. In countries with bad institutions, the central government is weak; 




groups act in a non-cooperative manner; each group maximizes its individual welfare 
ignoring the effect of its action on other groups.22 We will call this the polarized 
government case. 3) We assume that failure to repay the full amount of the debt 
constitutes default, and borrowers are excluded from the capital market as part of the 
default penalty.23 4) International lenders observe the number of powerful groups, the 
degree of polarization and how much debt the country (as a whole) demands, but they 
cannot match the group with the part of debt that is allocated to it. When a default 
decision is made, lenders are uncertain whether the decision is made by all the groups 
or one group and, in this last case, which group. Hence, when one group defaults, all 
groups are shut down from the international capital market.24  
 The two key elements of the model are i) institutional quality that can be good 
or bad depending if powerful groups can influence central government’s policies or 
not; ii) the degree of group polarization that is relevant only when there is bad 
institutions. This is because when there is good institution, even if the powerful 
groups are highly polarized, they cannot affect central government’s policies. These 
two elements are the counterparts of the two findings in section 2.2.2. 
                                                        
22 If there is a cost associated with coordination among groups that depends on the degree of 
polarization, c(η) , we are assuming that c(η) = ∞ , that is groups never coordinate. We can 
also assume that the cost for the groups to coordinate with each other is increasing in the 
degree of polarization, same conclusions can be reached.  
 
23 It is true that most defaults end up being partial, not complete, although sometimes after 
long negotiations. We do not model the renegotiation process or how long it takes. We simply 
assume that during this renegotiation process, the country lives in autarky. 
 
24 A less extreme case is when one group (for example, a province) defaults, investors 
perceive a higher risk of default in other groups too; therefore, risk premium increases to all 
groups. This implies the behavior of one group has an effect beyond its own. The case of 
Brazilian state Minas Gerais constitutes a clear example. The declaration of liquidation of its 
debt at the end of 1998 caused not only doubts about the ability of repayment of other states, 





 The model structure is based on Vegh (2010) Chapter 2. We have small open 
economies that take the international price as given. The saving or borrowing decision 
is made in period one; the repayment or default decision is made in period two. Since 
this is a finite horizon model, debt is sustainable if and only if default does not occur 
with probability one. For this reason, we assume a default cost in period two. For 
simplicity, we assume n=2.25 The two groups share the tax revenue Y collected by the 
central government. Let’s denote η group 1’s and 1-η group 2’s share of resources 
they receive from the government. Let η ∈(0,0.5]; hence, group 1 receives less 
transfers than group 2. Similar to Alesina and Drazen (1991), we use η to measure the 
degree of government polarization. That is, the more unequal the shares of resources 
that correspond to groups are, the larger the degree of polarization is.26 Revenue in 
period 2 (Y2 ) is the only source of uncertainty in this model. It is a random variable 
drawn from a uniform distribution with support [0, Y2
H ].  
 
2.3.1 Optimization Problem of the Unified Government 
 In this section, we solve the unified government case, which is the central 
planner solution. The objective of the planner is to maximize the sum of the two 
groups lifetime utility weighted by their relative power η subject to the economy-wide 
resource constraint. In period one, the planner chooses the aggregate spending and 
                                                        
25 Results are preserved for more than 2 groups.   
 
26 Alesina and Drazen (1991) used the fraction of tax burden borne by groups as measure of 





aggregate debt,27 given the revenue shock and the schedule of interest rate. In period 
two, the planner decides to repay or default the debt. To simplify the analysis, we will 
assume that preferences are linear.28  The objective function of the planner is given by 
                 (1) 
where superscript denotes groups, subscript denotes period and 0<β<1 denotes the 
discounting factor. The government budget constraint in each period is given by 
t = 1                        g11 + g1
2 = Y1 + B
U
t = 2 (default)         g1D + gD
2 = Y2 (1−φ)
t = 2 (repay)            g1R + gR












                                                        (2) 
where g1
1  denotes group 1’s consumption in period one; gD
1  and gR
1  denote group 1’s 
consumption in period two in the event of default and repayment, respectively. 
Similarly g1
2   denotes group 2’s consumption in period one; gD
2  and gR
2  denote group 
2’s consumption in period two in the event of default and repayment, respectively. 
BU  denotes the level of debt engaged by the planner in period 1 to be repaid in period 
2 in case that it chooses to; Y1  denotes period 1’s revenue, Y2  denotes period 2’s 
revenue, not known in the period 1; φ denotes share of the revenue that is lost if 
default is chosen; and rU  denotes the real interest rate charged by lenders to countries 
with a unified government.  
 In the second period the planner will repay the debt only if the cost of 
repaying it, given by (1+ rU )BU , is smaller than the cost of default φY2 . Therefore, 
default is optimal for low realizations of the revenue shock in period 2, that is, if 
                                                        
27 We focus on the case of borrowing in period 1 to be optimal by assuming 1-β(1+r)>0. 
 
























2 ; and repayment is optimal otherwise. Y
U*
2  is the threshold by which if the 
revenue shock is smaller than it, default will be optimal.  
Y2
U* = (1+ r
U )BU
φ
                                 (3) 
Let   denote the probability of default in the unified government case 
                 (4) 
 
2.3.2 Optimization Problem of the Polarized Government 
 In the polarized government case, in addition to having bad institutions (i.e., 
groups have power over central government’s decisions), they do not coordinate, thus 
giving rise to a negative externality that harms the collective welfare. Unlike the 
unified government case, each group makes spending, borrowing and default 
decisions independently. 






E[gi2 ] }                         (5) 
subject to the budget constraints 
t = 1                        gi1 = η
iY1 + b
i
t = 2 (default)         giD = η
iY2 (1−φ)
t = 2 (repay)            giR = η













                 (6) 
where η1 = η,η2 = 1−η  , bi denotes the level of debt engaged by group I in period 1 
to be repaid in period 2, and rP  denotes the interest rate charged by lenders to 












 In the second period, group i will repay its debt only if the cost of repaying, 
given by (1+ rP )bi , is smaller than the cost of default φηiY 2 . Default is optimal for 
low realizations of the revenue shock, that is, if Y2 < Y
P*
2 , and repayment is optimal 
otherwise. Y P*2  is the threshold by which if the revenue shock is smaller than it, 
default will be optimal for group i.  
Y2
P* = (1+ r
P )bi
ηiφ                             
(7)  
Let π i  denotes the default probability of group i.  
π i = Pr[Y2 ≤ Y2
P* ]                                                   (8) 
 
2.3.3 Foreign Lenders 
 Lenders are international investors with a funding cost of r, the risk-free 
interest rate. They are competitive and risk neutral. They know the quality of 
institutions, whether the country has a unified government or a polarized government. 
In the case of having a polarized government, they also know the degree of 
polarization, captured by η, and the distribution of revenue shock in period two. 
However, investors cannot identify the groups nor which portion of the total debt lent 
to the country corresponds to each group. Therefore investors do not lend directly to 
each group, but to the country as a whole. In this case, whenever investors do not 
collect the full amount of the contracted debt; that is, if at least one group fails to 
repay or both groups decide not to repay; it constitutes a default. Similarly, when the 
country demands one unit more of debt, lenders will charge the same interest rate 




 When facing a country with a unified government, lenders know the default 
probability in period two is given by πU . Using the zero profit condition we can pin 
down the equilibrium real interest rate charged by lenders to a unified government 
(1+ rU )(1−πU ) = 1+ r                       (9) 
where is given by (4) and r is the risk-free interest rate. 
 When the borrowing country has a polarized government with η degree of 
polarization, the equilibrium real interest rate charged by lenders is given by 
(1+ rP )(1−π P ) = 1+ r                   (10) 
where  
π P = max{π i }i=1
2
                   (11) 
Equation (11) means that the probability of default used by lenders to determine the 
interest rate they charge to the country with a polarized government is that of the 
group with the highest default probability. This is because failure to repay the full 
amount constitutes default in our model.29 As long as one group decides not to repay 
its portion of the total debt, the country will not be able to repay the full amount even 
if the other group chooses to repay.30 Hence, the relevant default probability for 
investors is the highest probability of the two groups. This is a negative externality in 
the case of countries with a polarized government. Assume that group i has the 
highest default probability. When it chooses to increase the amount of debt it borrows, 
                                                        
29 Reinhart & Rogoff (2010) define as external default crisis the failure of a government to 
meet a principal or interest payment on the due date. These episodes include instances in 
which rescheduled debt is ultimately extinguished in terms less favorable than the original 
obligation.  
 
30 In equilibrium, if one group chooses to default, the other group will find it optimal to 
default as well. This is because it has to incur the default cost regardless if it repays or not. 




to repay or to default, it does not take into account the effect of its action on the other 
group, which is to increase the borrowing cost of the other group. And in the case it 
chooses to default, it forces the other group to default as well. The cost of not 
repaying for group i is simply ηiφY2  but the full cost to the country is φY2 . For all 
values of ηi , the individual cost of default is strictly lower than the aggregate cost.  
 
2.3.4 Timing of the Events 
Unified government  
t=1 Planner chooses BU ; 
 interest rate is determined satisfying investors zero profit condition; 
 planner transfers to each group debt and revenue according to its share. 
t=2 Revenue shock is realized; 
 if Y2 < Y
U*
2 , it choose to default, if Y2 ≥ Y
U*
2  it chooses to repay;  
 if it defaults, each group receives its share of the revenue net of default cost                       
 ηY2 (1−φ),  (1−η)Y2 (1−φ) ; 
 if it repays, each group receives its share of revenue net of repayment               
 η[Y2 − (1+ r
U )B,  (1−η)[Y2 − (1+ r
U )B] . 
Polarized government 
t=1 Each group receives its share of revenue and chooses bi ; 
 total debt is the sum of bi , BP = bi
i=1
2
∑ . The central government goes to the 
 international capital market and demands ; 




t=2 Revenue shock is realized; 
 if Y2 < Y
P*
2 , groups choose to default; if Y2 ≥ Y
P*
2 , groups choose to repay; 
 if groups default, each group receives the share of revenue net of default cost 
 according to its share ηY2 (1−φ),  (1−η)Y2 (1−φ) ; 
 if both groups repay, each group receives the share of revenue net of 
 repayment ηY2 − (1+ r
P )bi ,  (1−η)Y2 − (1+ r
P )bi ] . 
 
2.3.5 The Equilibrium  
 In this section we solve the equilibrium default probabilities for the unified 
government and polarized government separately. Note that, conditional on the 
country having defaulted Y2 varies uniformly between 0 and Y2
U* in the unified 
government case, and between 0 and Y2
P* in the polarized government case. Similarly, 
conditional on the country having repaid, revenue varies uniformly between Y2
U*  and 
Y H2 in the unified government case, and between Y2




The expected revenue in period 2 is given by 




              
       (12) 




      
            (13) 




Having linear utility function allows us to rewrite the planner’s objective function (1) 





2 ]}                  (14) 
using (2), (9), (12) and (13), (14) can be written as  
UU = maxB{Y1 + βE[Y2 ]+ B





             (15)
 
The first order condition is given by: 
1= β(1+ r)+ βφπUY2
H dπU
dBU                   (16) 
The above marginal condition has a straightforward economic interpretation. In (16) 
we see that in choosing the optimal amount of debt, the marginal benefit of today to 
increase an additional unit of debt equals to the marginal cost of increasing one unit of 
debt tomorrow discounted. The marginal cost is composed by the sum of 1+r, the 
risk-free interest rate, and the marginal increase in the default probability times the 
revenue loss in case of default.  
Combining (3), (4), (9) and (16), we obtain: 
πU = 1− β(1+ r)
2 − β(1+ r)
  
                                             (17)                                                                                                           
Note that default probability is independent of the degree of polarization η. This is 
because there is no negative externality in the central planner case; all default costs 
are internalized. 




(1+ r)[2 − β(1+ r)]2
                  (18) 





In a polarized government, each group maximizes its lifetime utility subject to budget 
constraint taking as given the interest rate schedule the country faces. In equilibrium, 
the total debt that the central government borrows at the international capital market 
will be the sum of debts chosen by the two groups, each group contributing according 
its power η , 1-η . That is,  
bi + b j = BP ,bi = ηBP ,b j = (1−η)BP                 (20) 
In this case, the expected revenue in period 2 is given by 
E{Y2 / D} =
π PY2
H
2                     (21) 
E{Y2 / R} =
(1+π P )Y2
H
2                   (22) 









}              (23)
 
The first order condition is given by: 




                   (24) 
The economic interpretation of (24) is similar to the one given in the unified 
government case. However, a key difference should be noted: the second component 
of the marginal cost of increasing one unit of debt is only a fraction η of the total cost. 
This shows that group i when deciding the optimal level of debt ignores the additional 
effect that it imposes on the other group. That is a higher borrowing cost and it 




polarization, is associated with greater externality, increasing the resultant debt level 
and default probability.  
 Given that lenders charge the same interest rate to all groups, the marginal 
increase in interest rate is the same for an additional unit of the total debt and an 









                   (25) 






                        (26)
 
Combining (7), (8), (10), (20), (24) and (26), we obtain group i’s  default probability, 
π i = 1− β(1+ r)
β(1+ r)(η − 2)+ 2                        (27) 
A similar optimization problem of group j results in  
π j = 1− β(1+ r)
2 − β(1+ r)(η +1)
                       (28) 
Taking into account (11) and the fact that 0<η≤0.5, the default probability of a 
polarized government is given by 
π P = 1− β(1+ r)
2 − β(1+ r)(2 −η)
                       (29)
 
The equilibrium debt and interest rate are the following: 
bi = φY2
HηΩ                     (30) 
bj = φY2
H (1−η)Ω                       (31) 
BP = φY2




1+ rP = (1+ r)[2 − β(1+ r)(2 −η)]
1− β(1+ r)(1−η)
                      (33) 
where  
Ω = [1− β(1+ r)][1− β(1+ r)(1−η)]
(1+ r)[2 − β(1+ r)(2 −η)]2
 
 
Proposition 1: ∀ η, i) the default probability, ii) the level of total debt, and iii) the 
equilibrium interest rate are strictly higher in the polarized government case than in 
the unified government case, that is π P > πU ,rP > rU ,BP > BU . 
Proof. See appendix C. 
 
Proposition 2: In the polarized government case, ∀ η, i) the default probability, ii) 
the level of total debt, and iii) the equilibrium interest rate are increasing in the degree 









< 0 . 
Proof. See appendix C. 
  
Proposition 1 state that the quality of institution determines the likelihood of default 
independent of the distribution of powers. Given that the default probability is higher 
in the polarized government case, the equilibrium interest rate is higher to satisfy 
investors’ zero profit condition. The lack of coordination leads to overborrowing 
because groups do not internalize the aggregate cost of a marginal increase of the 
debt. Proposition 2 asserts how the degree of government polarization affects the 
equilibrium default probability, debt level and risk premium. The higher the degree of 




the higher the equilibrium interest rate. They are due to the fact that the size of the 
negative externality increases in the degree of polarization.  
 
2.4  Extending the Model to Infinite Periods  
In this section, we extend the two-period model into the infinite horizon 
framework of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). We adopt the quantitative analysis 
technique developed by Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008).  
 There is an additional default cost in the infinite horizon setup, that is, the risk 
of being excluded by the international capital market for a certain periods, also known 
as the reputation cost.31 This cost will dampen the incentive of the country to default 
because while the country is excluded from the capital market, it lives in autarky and 
consumption smoothing is not possible. 
 
2.4.1 Model Setup  






∑                     (34) 
where U(.) is strictly concave and differentiable, β ∈(0,1)  is the discount factor and 
gt
i  is the consumption of group i in period t. The central government receives a 
stochastic stream of revenue Y. We assume that Y follows a Markov process with 
transition function f(Y,Y’). The country has access to the international capital markets, 
where it can buy one period discount bonds B’ at price q(B’,Y). The bond price is a 
                                                        




function of the amount of bond B’ and the current revenue shock Y. When B’ is a 
negative number, it means the country receives –q(B’,Y)B’ units of goods and 
promises to repay, conditional on not defaulting, B’ units of goods the following 
period.  
 The timing of events can be summarized as follows:  at the beginning of the 
period, the country starts with a level of debt B. The revenue Y is realized and it is 
revealed to lenders. In the unified government case, the planner decides to repay or 
default on the previous period debt. If it chooses to repay, it also chooses how much 
to borrow. The equilibrium bond price is determined by satisfying the lender’s zero 
profit condition. After receiving -q(B’,Y)B’, Y+B-q(B’,Y)B’ is split between the two 
groups according to their share η and 1-η. If it chooses to default, from that period 
onward, the country will be in financial autarky until re-access. In the polarized 
government case, each group decides to repay or to default on its previous period debt 
simultaneously. If both groups repay, then each group also chooses how much to 
borrow. The central government then goes to the international capital market and sells 
sovereign bonds for the amount that is the sum of the two groups’ chosen debts. The 
equilibrium bond price is determined. If at least one group decides to default, lenders 
shut down the capital market to the country since failure of full repayment constitutes 
default. The country will remain in financial autarky until re-access. 
 
2.4.2 Default Decision in Unified Government 
 Like the two-period model, the planner’s problem is to maximize the 












                                      (35) 
The planner solves the following problem: If the country is active in the international 
capital market (i.e., it has not defaulted in the previous period) and has debt, it 
chooses to default or to repay; and in the case of repayment, how many new bonds to 
issue (B’).32  
 We define the optimization as a recursive problem. The state variables are the 
level of debt inherited from the previous period B and current revenue shock Y. We 
denote the value function for the unified government being active at state (B,Y) as 
VU (B,Y ) . With option to default, VU (B,Y )   satisfies 
VU (B,Y ) = max{D,R} {VD
U (Y ),VR
U (B,Y )}                 (36) 
where VD
U (Y )  is the value associated with default and VR
U (B,Y )  is the value 
associated with repayment. When the planner chooses to default, the country is in 
temporary financial autarky, total consumption equals to revenue net of default loss. 
The value of default is given by: 
VD
U (Y ) = ηU(g1 )+ (1−η)U(g2 )+ β µVU (0,Y ')+ (1− µ)VD
U (Y ')] f (Y ',Y )dY '
Y '
∫
s.t.          g1 + g2 = Y def
         (37) 
where µ  is the probability that the country will regain access to the international 
credit market. Following Arellano (2008) Y def = h(Y ) ≤ Y , h(.) an increasing function. 
When central planner chooses to repay, the value of remaining in credit relation is 
given by: 
                                                        
32 As in the two-period model, we will assume parameter values that make the agent always 
want to consume more in the current period relative to the next period; hence, we will only 





U (B,Y ) = maxB ' {ηU(g
1 )+ (1−η)U(g2 )+ β VU (B ',Y ') f (Y ',Y )dY '
Y '
∫ }
s.t.          g1 + g2 = Y + B − q(B ',Y )B '
             (38) 
The decision to default or to repay is a period-by-period decision. The default 
probability in the unified government case is  
πU (B,Y ) = Pr[VD
U (Y ) >VD
U (B,Y )]                  (39) 
 
2.4.3 Default Decision in the Polarized Government 






∑     i = 1,2                                           (40) 
Each group solves the following problem simultaneously: If the country is active in 
the international credit market and the group i has debt ( ), it chooses to default or 
to repay; and in the case of repayment, it chooses how many new bonds to sell ( ). 
The state variables for each group are the level of debt inherited from the previous 
period , the revenue shock Y and the aggregate bond B’. We denote the value 
function of interest group i of a country with polarized government being active at 
state (bi ,B,Y )  as V Pi (bi ,B,Y )  . Group i decides whether to default or repay its debt 
to maximize its individual utility function. With option to default, V Pi (bi ,B,Y )  
satisfies  





i ,B,Y )}                             (41) 
When at least one group decides to default, the country is in temporary financial 






Pi (Y ) =U(gi )+ β µV Pi (0.0,Y ')+ (1− µ)VD
Pi (Y ')] f (Y ',Y )dY '
Y '
∫
s.t.          gi = ηiY def
i = 1,2
η1 = η,  η2 = 1−η
             (42) 
When both groups decide to repay, the value of remaining in credit relation is given 
by: 
VR
Pi (bi ,B,Y ) = max
bi '
{U(gi )+ +β VPi (b
i ',B ',Y ') f (Y ',Y )dY '
Y '
∫ }
s.t.          gi = ηiY + bi − q(B ',Y )bi '
             (43) 
The default probability of group i is given by  
π P,i (bi ,B,Y ) = Pr[VD
P,i (Y ) >VR
P,i (bi ,B,Y )]  
Whenever the country fails to repay the full amount (i.e., at least one group decides to 
default on its debt) lenders exclude the country (i.e., all groups) from the capital 
market. Therefore, the default risk that is relevant to determine the equilibrium bond 
price is the maximum default probability of the two groups.  
π P (B,Y ) = max{π P,i}i=1
2  
 
2.4.4 The Equilibrium Bond Price 
 Foreign investors are risk neutral and competitive. Given B’, the country’s 
total amount of debt, the revenue Y and the default risk, the bond price for both 
unified and polarized government satisfies 
q(B ',Y ) = 1−π (B ',Y )
1+ r
                   (44) 





2.5 Quantitative Analysis  
 We now turn to test the success of the model in matching the stylized facts we 
identified in section 2 quantitatively. The numerical analysis uses parameter values 
that are standard in the literature.  
 
2.5.1 Functional Forms and Parameters 






The revenue process is assumed to be a log-normal AR(1) 
log(Yt ) = ρ log(Yt−1 )+ εt ,  E[ε] = 0,E[ε
2 ] = σ  
We use the Arellano (2008) output cost structure33 that takes the following form  
Y def =
(1−φ)Y             if Y > Ŷ









Each period refers to a quarter. The discount factor β is set to 0.95; the risk-free 
interest rate 1%; the coefficient of relative risk aversion 2; the probability of re-access 
to the capital market after default µ=0.1, which implies an average duration of 2.5 
years of staying in autarky, similar to the estimate by Gelos et al. (2004) and the 
output loss when staying in autarky 2%. Values for parameters of the revenue process 
                                                        





are: ρ=0.9 and σ y  =3.4%, which is the value used in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), 
also similar to many business cycle models. 
 
2.5.2 Simulation Results  
 We simulate the model for the unified government and polarized government 
cases separately. In the polarized government case, simulation is conducted for three 
degrees of polarization: high η=0.1, medium η=0.3 and low η=0.5.  The 
computational algorithm used to solve the model can be found in the appendix D. 
 Figure 22 shows the bond price schedule faced by the countries a unified 
government as a function of assets B’ for two revenue shocks that are one standard 
deviation above and below the trend. Bond prices are an increasing function of asset, 
making larger levels of debt to be associated with lower price. Booms are associated 
with higher bond price, which implies lower interest rate. This is because revenue is 
persistent: higher revenue in the current period predicts higher revenue in the next 
period, and therefore less likely to default. This endogenous countercyclical interest 
rate is standard in the sovereign default literature and consistent with the data. Figure 
23 shows the default decision rule as a function of revenue at a given level of debt: 1 
denotes default, 0 denotes repayment. Default is optimal when revenue shock is low. 
This is also consistent with the data, since most defaults occur in recessions. The fact 
that the central planner maximizes the collective welfare, the relative power of the 
groups, i.e., η, does not affect the optimal decision, therefore, the price schedule and 






Figure 22- Bond price schedule: Unified government  
 
 
Figure 23- Default rule: Unified government 
  
 Figures 24 and 25 correspond to the case of countries with a low degree of 
polarization, that is η=0.5 . Compared to the unified government case, bond price is 
lower for any given Y and B’.  This is because default probability is higher for 
countries with a polarized government; to compensate for the higher default risk, 
interest rate is higher (bond price lower). Price zero means there is no market for 
bonds at that level because at that level of debt, default probability is one. This is 
known as the default set. Comparing Figure 8 to Figure 10, the default set is larger in 




Figure 24- Bond price schedule: Polarized government (η=0.5) 
 
 
Figure 25- Default rule: Polarized government (η=0.5) 
 
 
 Comparing Figure 23 to Figure 25, countries with a polarized government 
default in more states of the revenue shock than countries with a unified government 
at any given level of debt. Figures 26 and 27 show the case of countries with high 
degree of polarization, η = 0.1 . The default set becomes even larger and there are 












Figure 27- Default rule: Polarized government (η=0.1)  
 
 
 In order to study the long-run default probabilities, we simulate the model 
10,000 periods 100 times for the unified government case and for the polarized 
government cases. We compare simulation results with the data. The average 
polarization in the data given that there is some degree of polarization (η≠0) is 0.34; 




i) countries without polarization (η=0); ii) countries with low polarization (η<0.12); 
iii) countries with medium polarization (0.12≤η<0.34), and iv) countries with high 
polarization (η≥0.34). We then take the average default probability of each group and 
compare it to the simulation result. For the simulation, default probability is 
calculated as number of periods that the country defaults divided to total number of 
periods that the country has access to the capital market. Autarky periods are 
excluded.  
 Results of the two-period model are confirmed in this infinite horizon setting. 
Simulation results of the model in Table 9 show that the default probability is higher 
for countries with a polarized government. Default probability in the unified 
government case is 1.78%, lower than the polarized government case, 2.64%. 
Furthermore, default probability is increasing in the degree of polarization. At low 
degree of polarization, the default probability is 2.04%, at medium degree 2.56% and 
at high degree 3.34%. Compared to the data, our model explains more than 70% of 
the observed default frequencies for each polarization group. Note that for the 
simulations we use are the same set of parameters values for both unified and 
polarized government cases; the only differences are the institutional quality and the 
degree of polarization. In the data, the heterogeneity among countries are more than 





Table 9- Summary Statistics of Default Probabilities: Simulations Results 
 Default Probability (in percent) 
 Data Simulation 
Unified government  2.29 1.78 
Polarized government   
         Low  (η=0.5) 2.45 2.04 
         Medium (η=0.3) 3.27 2.56 
         High  (η=0.1) 4.76 3.34 
Note: in the data, unified government are countries with zero polarization; polarized government 
with low degree of polarization are countries with polarization below 0.12; polarized government 
with medium polarized are countries with polarization between 0.12 and 0.34 and polarized 
government with high polarization are countries with polarization above 0.34.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 We have provided an explanation for the cross-country differences in 
sovereign default frequencies.  The key factor that determines the likelihood of 
default in this paper is the institutional setting. If institutions set clear rules to limit the 
influence of powerful groups in central government’s spending and borrowing 
decisions, the central planner solution that maximizes collective welfare can be 
achieved. If such institutions do not work properly, individual behaviors of powerful 
groups lead to an inefficient equilibrium in which default occurs more often. 
Furthermore, given that powerful groups do not coordinate in the polarized 
government case, more polarization results in higher default probabilities. 
In the two-period model, we showed that a country with a unified government 
is less likely to default than a country with a polarized government. This is because in 
the unified government case, there is either good institutions that limit the influence of 
powerful groups in the central government’s decisions or that the groups can 
coordinate; thus, the central planner’s solution that maximizes the collective welfare 




decisions ignoring the effect of its action on other groups. As a result, suboptimal 
choices are made and default is more likely.  
Numerical simulation of the infinite horizon model succeeds in showing the 
cross-country difference in terms of default probability and degree of polarization.  
We are able to match the empirical positive relationship between degrees of 
polarization and default probabilities using standard values for the parameters. 
One policy implication of the paper is that efforts of international 
organizations to help serial defaulters to prevent future sovereign debt crisis should 
not only provide assistance in designing better fiscal policies, but most important, 
should tackle the root of the problem: institutions. Chapter 1 of this thesis shows that 
the IMF program does not necessarily halt the ultimate crisis. In many cases, 
countries default within three years of an IMF bailout. The notorious example is 
Argentina, which received large bailout packages in 2000 and again in 2001, but 
nevertheless defaulted in 2002.  
Our results show that if there are institutions that limit the influence of 
powerful groups in central government’s debt and fiscal policies, the central planner’s 
solution that maximizes the collective welfare can be reached. If such institutions are 
absent, individually optimal behavior by each group translates into an inefficient 
equilibrium in which the default risk is higher and it increases with the degree of 
polarization. However, how to set the framework and make it effective would be 
country specific. For example, in the case of Argentina, the failure of the system is 
that there is centralized tax collection but spending and borrowing decisions are 
decentralized. This fiscal asymmetry causes a spending and borrowing bias because of 




institutional failure and eliminate the negative externality in this case would be either 
to centralize financing (borrowing and tax collection) and spending decisions, or to 







Table A1- Average duration of crises 
 External Default Inflation Banking 
 Median Average Median Average Median Average 
World 8 15.1 1 2.3 1 2.5 
High income 9 20.7 1 1.6 1 1.7 
Middle and 
Low* 4 14.1 1 2.4 3 4.0 
Latin America 9 14.6 1 3.2 2 2.7 
* Excluding Latin America 
Note: Duration of a default crisis is calculated as number of years between the starting year and 
end year of the crisis. For example: Argentina had defaulted in 1982 and it didn’t resolve it until 
1993. In this case, the duration of this episode of default crisis is 12.  Inflation crisis dating is 
straightforward per definition in text.  As Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) note, dating the end of 
banking crises is very difficult, though in any event, they are typically relatively short. 
Sample coverage: 198 episodes of default crisis (high income: 28, middle and low: 170); 462 
episodes of inflation crisis (high income: 166, middle and low: 296); 201 episodes of banking 
crisis (high income: 108, middle and low: 93). 














Duration of external default crises 
Frequency distribution (in percent): 1800-2008 
High vs. Middle and low income 
 
Note: Duration of defaults is calculated as number of years between start of a default crisis and the year 
that is resolved. The end of a default episode is considered as the year the country regains access to the 
capital market. In other words, as long as the country is excluded from the international capital market, 
it is not considered as having resolved its default crisis.  
Sample coverage: 218 episodes of default crisis (high income: 32, middle and low: 186). 
















































Duration of defaults (in years) 















Angola 1975 1991 Angolan Civil War 5.57 1985 
Colombia 1899 1903 
Colombia vs. Liberals 
of 1899 
2.60 1900 
Germany 1939 1945 World War II 4.39 1939 
Guatemala 1961 1996 Guatemalan Civil War 1.14 
1986, 
1989 
Hungary  1941 1945 World War II 1.46 
1941-
1967 
Japan 1941 1945 World War II 2.41 1942 
Mexico 1910 1914 
Mexico vs. Liberals 
&Radicals 
1.65 1914 




Paraguay 1932 1935 Chaco 3.91 1932 
Turkey 1914 1918 World War I 1.75 1915 













Figure A2  
Duration of “tranquil times” conditional on having had at least one crisis 
Frequency distribution (in percent): 1800-2008 








































External default crises*: Duration of “tranquil times” conditional on having had 
at least one crisis 
Frequency distribution (in percent): 1800-2008 
High vs. Middle and Low income 
 
* Excluding default episodes started after and during severe wars. 
Note:  See corresponding figure 8 in text 










































Number of years between two defaults 





Default reversal: Note on hazard rate analysis 
 
Definition 
 The hazard rate is the probability of a country having a crisis at time t+1 given 
that it has not had a crisis at time t.  The hazard rate is calculated conditioned on the 
length of time since the last crisis. Thus we are looking at the subset of countries that 
had at least one crisis event (default in this particular calculation).  For example: 
Country A had a default crisis in 2001 and it ended in 2003. The hazard rate of crisis 
in 2010 for country A indicates the probability of having a crisis in 2010 conditioned 
on it being crisis free for 7 years.  
 The nonparametric analysis makes no assumptions about the shape of the 
hazard function or about how variables affect it. Instead, the hazard function is 
estimated based on the data, using the Kaplan-Meier (1958) method.  (KM is a 
descriptive procedure for time-to-event variables, commonly used when time is 
considered the only salient variable). 
 Figure B1 shows the hazard rate of default reversal for the entire sample (167 
episodes).  The vertical axis indicates the probability of having a default crisis and the 
horizontal axis indicates years since the end of the last default episode. For less than 
60 years, the hazard rate declines with the length of the crisis-free spell. That is, the 
longer the country remains crisis-free, the lower the probability of it having another 
default crisis. But there is a break in year 60.  After 60 years of being crisis-free, the 




default crisis cycle every 60 years or it might be an artifact of the sparseness of the 
sample if countries that go 60 years without a crisis. 
 
Figure B1 
Hazard rate of default reversal:  Full sample 
 
 
 Figure B2 separates the sample by income level. For high income countries, 
the hazard function monotonically decreases with respect to the length of tranquil 
time, approaching zero when the country has been crisis-free for more than 60 years. 
However, for middle and low income countries, the hazard function slightly declines 
in the first 60 years of tranquil time, but it starts to increase after year 60. This means, 
for countries that had been crisis-free for more than 60 years, the hazard rate of 
having another crisis increases every year, indicating a default cycle is highly 
probable for this income group. One explanation for such a pattern in the middle and 
low income group is that once a long period of time has passed since the last crisis, 








Hazard rate of default reversal: High vs. Middle and Low income 
 
 
Parametric analysis specifies the shape of the baseline hazard function as well as 
how the covariates affect the hazard function. We assume proportional hazard models. 
Covariates are assumed to raise or lower the hazard function in a multiplicative way.  
 The baseline hazard function is Weibull, which encompasses a baseline hazard 
function that may be flat like exponential models, monotonically increasing or 
decreasing. We use as covariates: Lag world share of countries in default crisis and 
three dummy variables: i) being in a severe war the year of crisis reversal; ii) pre 1914 
and iii) income level equals 1 for all high income countries and 0 for rest of the world. 
 Table B1 reports the results of the parametric analysis. The coefficients have 




during the previous year increases the hazard of default reversal by roughly 2 percent. 
Both severe war and pre-World War I have coefficients close to zero and are not 
significant. Being a high income country decreases the hazard of default reversal by 
0.23 percent point, however, this change is too small to be significant. The hazard 
ratio shows the qualitative effect of covariates to hazard rates. When it is greater than 
1, it increases the hazard rate, when it is less than 1, it decreases the hazard rate and 
when it equals 1, it does not affect the hazard rate. Alpha measures the rate of change 
over time of the hazard rate. In this case, alpha equals to -0.11 indicating a decline of 
hazard of about 11% per year.  Finally p measures time dependence. For p less than 1, 
there is negative time dependence, meaning the longer the country stay in tranquil 




Table B1- Parametric analysis: hazard rate of default reversal 
 
Note: Lag share of countries in default is the percentage of countries in default crisis the year before the 
default reversal; severe war is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the country that had default reversal 
was in severe war (defined as death to population larger than 0.8%); High income is a dummy variable 
that equals to 1 if the country that had default reversal is a high income country. In parenthesis we 
report the p-value. 
Variable Weibull model 
 Coefficient Hazard ratio 
Lag share of countries in default  2.04 7.68 
  (0.02)  
Severe war  0.05 1.05 
  (0.87)  
Pre-World War I 0.09 1.10 
 (0.61)  
High income  -0.23 0.79 
  (0.29)  
cons -2.79  
alpha -0.11  





Proposition 1: ∀ η, i) the default probability, ii) the level of total debt, and iii) the 
equilibrium interest rate are strictly higher in countries with a polarized government 
than those with a unified government, that is, . 
Proof: 
i) Comparing (17) to (29) 
π P > πU  iff  β(1+ r)(η − 2)+ 2 < 2 − β(1+ r)
β(1+ r)(η −1) < 0
 
ii) Comparing (18) to (30) 
BP > BU  iff  [1− β(1+ r)(1−η)]
[2 − β(1+ r)(2 −η)]2
> 1
[2 − β(1+ r)]2
 
First we will prove show that 
∂(BP − BU )
∂η
< 0  
∂(BP − BU )
∂η








H [1− β(1+ r)]{β(1+ r)2[β(1+ r)(η − 2)+ 2]2 − 2[β(1+ r)(η −1)+1][β(1+ r)(η − 2)+ 2]β(1+ r)2 }
(1+ r)2[β(1+ r)(η − 2)+ 2]4
∂BP
∂η
< 0 iff  [β(1+ r)(η − 2)+ 2]2 − 2[β(1+ r)(η −1)+1][β(1+ r)(η − 2)+ 2] < 0
[β(1+ r)(η − 2)+ 2]2 − 2[β(1+ r)(η −1)+1][β(1+ r)(η − 2)+ 2] =
= [β(1+ r)(η − 2)+ 2][β(1+ r)(η − 2)+ 2 − {2[β(1+ r)(η −1)+1]} = (η − 2)− 2(η −1) < 0
⇒ ∂(B




Since ( ) is strictly increasing in η, it is suffice to show > 0 ∀η  if 
> 0 at η=0 and η=0.5. 
BP − BU = [1− β(1+ r)][2 − β(1+ r)]2 − [2 − 2β(1+ r)]2
             = 4β(1+ r)− β 2 (1+ r)2 − 3β(1+ r)





























BP − BU  evaluated at η = 0.5
BP − BU = [1− β(1+ r)0.5][2 − β(1+ r)]2 − [2 − 2β(1+ r)1.5]2
             = 2β(1+ r)− β(1+ r)0.5[4 − 4β(1+ r)+ β 2 (1+ r)2 ]−1.25β 2 (1+ r)2
             = 1.5 − β(1+ r) > 0
 
 
iii) Given that , using (9) and (10), it is easy to see that . 
Proposition 2: Given that there is polarization in the government, ∀ η, i) the default 
probability, ii) the level of total debt, and iii) the equilibrium interest rate are 














= − [1− β(1+ r)]β(1+ r)
[2 − β(1+ r)(2 −η)]2
< 0   
 





2[1− β(1+ r)(1−η)]− (1+ r)[2 − β(1+ r)(2 −η)]β(1+ r)
[1− β(1+ r)(1−η)]2














We use the discrete state-space method. We generate the AR(1) process for revenue 
with a discrete Markov chain using 21 equally spaced grids. The asset space is 
discretized into 100 possible values. We make sure that the limits of our asset space 
never bind.  
The computational algorithm used to solve the unified government case is the 
following: 
1. Start with a guess for the bond price schedule such that q0 (B,Y ) = 1 / (1+ r)  for all B’ 
and Y. 
2. Given the bond price schedule and an initial guess for VU
D,0 and VU
R,0 , iterate on the 
















U }  and the optimal policy functions. 
3. We compute a new bond price schedule q1(B,Y )  using default sets and repayment 
sets such that lenders’ zero profit condition is satisfied. We then compare the new 
bond price schedule to the previous iteration’s. If a convergence criterion is satisfied, 
that is, max{q0 (B,Y )− q1(B,Y )} < ε  then proceed to the next step. Otherwise, update 
the price and go back to step 2. 
4. Compute default probabilities from 10,000 periods.  
 
The computational algorithm used to solve the polarized government case is the 
following:  





2. Given the bond price schedule and an initial guess for VPi
D,0  and VPi
R,0 , iterate on the 















Pi}  and the optimal policy functions for each i=1,2. 
3. We compute a new bond price schedule q1(B,Y )  using default sets and repayment 
sets such that π P = max{π Pi}i=1
2  and lenders’ zero profit condition are satisfied. We 
then compare the new bond price schedule to the previous iteration’s. If a 
convergence criterion is satisfied, that is, max{q0 (B,Y )− q1(B,Y )} < ε  then proceed 
to the next step. Otherwise, update the price and go back to step 2. 
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